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INTRODUCTION
Widespread agreement exists that press comment on a criminal case
is potentially prejudicial to the defendant when information is reported
that may not be admissible as evidence in a trial.' If a confession or other
evidence is held to be madmissible, the possibility still exists that this
information will reach jurors through press comment before or during
the trial, thereby prejudicing them against the defendant. This article
deals with the remedies courts have at their disposal to protect the
defendant whose case has received adverse press coverage before or dur-
ing a trial. Because Sheppard v. Maxwell2 was a watershed in the devel-
opment of case law on the fair trial-free press problem, this article first
examines the major remedies developed prior to Sheppard and then
assesses the consequences of Sheppard by examining the legal develop-
ments which have occurred in the fair trial-free press area since 1966.
LEGAL REMEDIES FOR PRETRIAL PUBLICITY
The Voir Dire
One of the chief legal remedies available to protect the criminal
O A.B., Southeastern Louisiana College, 1961; MA., Louisiana State University, 1963;
Ph.D., University of Wisconsin, 1971. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Wicuta
State Umversity. The author is grateful to Professor David Fellman of the University
of Wisconsin for his suggestions for improvement of an earlier version of this article.
1. See A B.A. PRojFcT ON MINIMuM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAl. JusncE, STANDARDS
RELATING To FAIR TRIAL Am FREE PRESS 3-4 (Tentative Draft 1966) [hereinafter cited
as the REARDON REPORT].
2. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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defendant from deleterious incidents of adverse press comment is the
voir dire, the examination of members of a jury panel by the judge,
counsel, or both. If a venireman indicates bias against a criminal de-
fendant, he may be challenged for cause and excused from service. The
problem of the voir dire, however, is not the juror who candidly an-
nounces an irremovable bias against the accused, but the juror who does
not recognize his bias. Justice Peckham once observed that "prejudice
is such an elusive condition of the mind that it is most difficult, if not
impossible, to always recognize its existence, . . ." and that "it might
exist in the mind of one.., who was quite positive that he had no bias,
and said that he was perfectly able to decide the question wholly unin-
fluenced by anything but the evidence." a The nature of modern com-
munications further complicates the problem by making it likely that
a juror will have some knowledge of a criminal case before it comes to
trial.
The established rule is that neither mere knowledge about a case nor
an opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused is sufficient
ground to sustain a challenge for cause. The widely publicized case of
United States v. Burn' presented the question whether a juror with a
preformed opinion should be qualified to serve in a criminal case. Al-
though a juror should enter a case with an open mind, Chief Justice
John Marshall noted "that light impressions which may fairly be sup-
posed to yield to the testimony" do not disqualify a juror, "but that
those strong and deep impressions which will close the mind against the
testimony" do constitute valid grounds to sustain a challenge for cause.-
In Reynolds v. United States,6 Chief Justice Waite observed that if the
preformed opinion is "hypothetical only, the partiality is not so mani-
fest as to necessarily set the juror aside." 7 Thus, in a day "of newspaper
enterprise and universal education" when "every case of public interest
is almost, as a matter of necessity brought to the attention of all the
intelligent people in the vicinity," the trial court's ruling not to dismiss
a juror for cause should not be reversed "unless the error is manifest." 1
The Reynolds Court found that there was no "positive and decided"
opinion held by the jurors, and indicated that great deference should
3. Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909).
4. 25 F. Cas. 49 (No. 14,692) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
5. Id. at 51.
6. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
7. Id. at 155.
8. Id. at 155-56.
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be given to the decision of the trial judge on the question, for the
demeanor and manner of witnesses and jurors are more indicative of
their true state of mind than the printed record
The Reynolds rule is strongly adhered to in both state and federal
courts.'0 Moreover, 25 states have 'enacted statutes which permit jurors
to serve if they have tentative opinions about the merits of the case or
- the guilt or innocence of the accused. 11 California law is typical in re-
quiring that no "person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of
having formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be
submitted to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in
public journals, circulars, or other literature . *..." 12 A New York
statute provides that "the... expression or formation of an opinion, or
impression in reference to the guilt or innocence of the defendant... is
not sufficient ground of challenge for actual bias .... " Neither ex-
posure to publicity nor the holding of a mere opinion by the juror is
valid ground for challenge.
9. Id. at 157.
10. See, e.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); Butler v. United States, 351
F.2d 14 (8th Cit. 1965); Rees v. Peyton, 341 F.2d 859 (4th Cit. 1965); Hickock v. Crouse,
334 F.2d 95 (10th Cit. 1964); United States v. Mitchell, 319 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1963);
Beck v. United States, 298 F.2d 622 (9th Cit. 1962); Torrance v. Salzinger, 297 F.2d 902
(3d Cit. 1962); Rowe v. State, 224 Ark. 671, 275 S.W.2d 887 (1955); Howell v. State,
220 Ark. 278, 247 S.W.2d 952 (1952); Clemson v. State, 218 Ga. 755, 130 S.E.2d 745
(1963); State v. Brazile, 234 La. 145, 99 So. 2d 62 (1958); Garlitz v. State, 71 Md. 293,
18 A. 39 (1889); State v. Wilson, 436 S.W.2d 633 (Mo. 1969); State v. Johnson, 362 Mo.
833, 245 S.W.2d 43 (1951); State v. Casey, 34 Nev. 154,, 117 P. 5 (1911); State v.
Simmons, 120 N.J.L. 85, 198 A. 294 (1937); Fleming v. State, 62 Okla. Crim. 446, 72
P.2d 403 (1937); Commonwealth v. Swanson, 432 Pa. 293, 248 A.2d 12 (1968); Common-
wealth v. Richardson, 392 Pa. 528, 140 A.2d 828 (1958); State v. Flack, 77 S.D. 176, 89
N.W.2d 30 (1958); Manning v. State, 155 Tenn. 266, 292 S.W. 451 (1927); State v. Beck,
56 Wash. 2d 474, 349 P.2d 387 (1960); State v. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d 527, 129 N.W.2d i55
(1964).
11. Aiuz. R. CraM. P. 218, 220; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-1923 (1947); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1076 (1956); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-5-3 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3301
(1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 913.03 (1941); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, § 14 (1967); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 9-1504 (1956); LA. REv. STAT. § 15:351 (1950); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 287.1033
(1962); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1763 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.150 (1949); NEB. RiEv.
STAT. §§ 29-2006, 25-1636 (1943); N.Y. CODE CriM. Paoc. § 6.376 (1957); N.D. CETr.
CoE § 29-17-38 (1961); OHio REv. CODE AN. § 2945.25 (1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 662 (1951); ORE. REv. STAT. § 2.145 (1953); S.D. COMP. LAWS § 23-43-35 (1967);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2507 (1956); TEx. CODE CR. PRoc. art. 35.16 (1965); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-30-21 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.49.90 (1950); Wis. STAT. ANN.
1957.17 (1965); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-225 (1957).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1076 (West 1956).
13. N.Y. CODE CruM. PRoc. § 6.376 (1957). But see the PaoPosED NEW YORK CRIMINAL
PRocEDURE LAW § 270.20(1) (1969) effective Sept. 1, 1971.
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Of course, the question remains, What constitutes actual bias?' 4 When
does an opinion pass the threshold of being tentative and become fixed?
How does the trial or appellate judge determine if an opinion is fixed
and therefore prejudicial to the accused? The case law suggests that
one significant, sometimes determinative, indication is the use the ac-
cused makes of his peremptory and for cause challenges. If the accused
does not use all of his peremptory challenges or does not challenge
a juror for cause, courts are likely to hold that the defendant in waiving
some or all of his challenges has expressed his satisfaction with the
impartiality of the chosen jury.15 The time to challenge jurors is at the
voir dire, not on appeal or after the jury's verdict has been delivered.
This rule tends to place the defense attorney in a dilemma. He can
challenge a juror for actual bias, have that challenge overruled, and risk
the possibility that the juror will be prejudiced against the accused as
a result of the challenge itself. On the other hand, the defense attorney
can refrain from challenging a juror for actual bias and hope that the
juror has not been biased against the accused by exposure to prejudicial
press comment.' 6 In contrast to the assumption that a fair jury has been
obtained if the defense attorney does not fully exercise his challenges,
there is also a tendency to regard an exhaustive voir dire as an indica-
tion of judicial care likely to result in an impartial jury. Thus, in the
Brink's robbery case it was held that the judge's voir dire of some 1,104-
veniremen and the exercise of 262 peremptory challenges by the de-
fendants were signs of "a patient and careful" employment of judicial
discretion.'
Another judicial requirement is that the accused has the burden of
showing actual bias.'" The burden must "be sustained not as a matter
14. Actual bias refers to a state of mind which renders a juror partial.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Ragland, 375 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1967); Woods v. Munns,
347 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1965); Dranow v. United States, 307 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1962);
State v. Winsett, 205 A.2d 510 (Del. 1964); People v. Sisti, 87 Ill. App. 2d 107, 230
N2E.2d 500 (1967); Ciucci v. People, 21 Ill. 2d 81, 171 N.E.2d 34 (1960); State v.
Hickock, 188 Kan. 473, 363 P.2d 541 (1961); State v. Trantino, 45 N.J. 37, 211 A.2d
193 (1965); State v. LaRocca, 81 N.J. Super. 40, 194 A.2d 578 (1963); State v. Truman,
124 Vt. 285, 204 A.2d 93 (1964).
16. REARDON REPORT 126-128 (1966) deals with voir dire problems relating to motions
for continuance or change of venue.
17. Commonwealth v. Geagan, 339 Mass. 487, 502-503, 159 N.E.2d 870, 873 cert. denied,
361 U.S. 895 (1959). Cf. RFA N REPoRT 58-59 (1966).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Ragland, 375 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1967); Woods v. Munns,
347 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1965); State v. Hickock, 188 Kan. 473, 363 P.2d 541 (1961).
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of speculation but as a demonstrable reality." 19 The mere possibility
that a juror may have been biased as a result of pretrial press publicity
is not enough to sustain a showing of actual bias. Moreover, great weight
is accorded to the opinion of the trial judge, who is in a position to ob-
serve the demeanor and mannerisms of veniremen.2 0 The trial judge
may sustain or overrul'e a challenge for actual bias within the sound
,exercise of his discretion, and his decision will be reversed only on the
clear showing that he has abused that discretion.21 For example, an
appellate court is likely to affirm the decision of a trial judge when
merely conflicting testimony respecting the impartiality of a juror is
introduced on the voir dire.22
The language of courts regarding jury bias seems somewhat archaic
in an era which values the psychology of unconscious motivations. To
assert that jurors can set aside initial impressions formed by pretrial press
comment is contrary to the findings of modern research indicating that
a person's first exposure to information about an issue will shape his
future attitudes toward that subj'ect.2 This does not imply that the
juror is dishonest who says h'e can set aside a "tentative opinion," but
.suggests that such a juror may not be aware of his latent biases. Yet,
the discretion of the trial judge on voir dire is only infrequently dis-
turbed by appellate judges who operate on the assumption that impart
tiality and objectivity are realities that can be ascertained by the trial
judge. There are limits, however, within which trial judges must remain
if they are not to abuse their discretion. A trial judge may not force
declarations of impartiality from jurors by extensive cross-examination
of veniremen, by asking leading questions, or by appeals to the juror's
civic duty to be impartial. 4 It is reversible error for a trial judge to
19. The quotation is from Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269,
281 (1942), and is frequently quoted in cases on jury bias.
20. A representative statement is found in People v. McGonegal, 136 N.Y. 62, 71, 32
N.E. 616, 619 (1892).
21. See notes 10 and 15 supra.
22. See State v. Flack, 77 S.D. 176, 89 N.W.2d 30 (1958).
23. The Reardon Committee relied upon psychological data and inferences to support
its argument that prejudicial press publicity may shape the kinds of opinions jurors hold.
REARDON REPORT 61-65 (1966). For a similar approach, see Comment, Fair Trial v. Free
Press: The Psychological Effect of Pre-Trial Publicity on the Juror's Ability to be
Impartial: A Plea for Reform, 38 S. CAL. L. Rav. 672 (1965). The findings of the Uni-
versity of Chicago Jury Project on the voir dire suggest that the values of jurors play
a definite role in jury decision-making and that attorneys are likely to use the voir dire
as a means of educating jurors rather than detecting bias. See Broeder, Voir Dire
Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 503 (1965).
24. Coughlin v. People, 144 Il1. 140, 33 NE. 1 (1893). Cf. Fuller v. State, 269 Ala
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overrule a challenge for cause when the juror declares on voir dire that
it will take evidence to change his opinion.25 Similarly, it is reversible
error not to sustain a challenge for cause when the juror declares that
as a result of press accounts he has an opinion which would lead him to
choose the testimony of a witness for the prosecution over that of the
accused. 6
Although jurors are not disqualified for holding tentative opinions
concerning the guilt or innocence of the accused, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in 1954 held, in Juelich v. United States,27 that it
is reversible error to try an accused before a jury every member of
which possesses a belief in the guilt of the accused. Juelich and his co-
defendant had been convicted of the murder of a Deputy United States
Marshal, and the media characterized the defendants as "outlaws, des-
perados, killers, and murderers." 2 The press also reported that Juelich
had a long criminal record and had confessed to the crime. 9 Of the 71
jurors examined on voir dire, 65 testified to their belief in the guilt of
one or both defendants.30 The court cited the Reynolds rule as appli-
cable to the case, but in view of the difficulty in securing an impartial
jury, it held that the trial court should have granted the defendants'
application for a change of venue, or in the alternative a continuance
of the case.-"
While Juelich v. United States has been regarded by some as the first
'significant step toward greater protection of the criminal defendant
against adverse press comment, 32 it was not until 1961, in Irvin v.
312, 113 So. 2d 153 (1959). Here it was held there was no error for the trial judge
to define a fixed opinion as a "buttheaded opinion."
25. Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959).
26. State v. Spidle, 413 S.W.2d 509 (Mo. 1967).
27. 214 F.2d 950, 955 (5th Cir. 1954).
28. Id. at 952.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 956.
32. McKay, An Academic View in Symposium, Free Press and Fair Trial, i1 VIu. L.
-REv. 726, 730 (1966). Cf. United States ex rel. Sheffield v. Waller, 126 F. Supp. 537
(W.D. La. 1954). This case was a habeas corpus proceeding in which relief was
granted where the accused was arrested, indicted, tried, and convicted within 19 days.
The press in Waller published articles concluding that the accused was guilty, and the
defendant confessed without the assistance of counsel. The state trial judge denied
motions for continuance and change of venue. The federal court ordered that the
accused be discharged and released unless the state granted the accused a fair trial within
six months.
[Vol. 13:1
. ADVERSE PRESS COVERAGE'
Dowd,3' that the Supreme Court reversed a conviction on the grounds
that prejudicial press publicity had denied the accused his constitutional
right to a fair and impartial trial. Irvin was indicted in 1955 by a
Vanderburgh County, Indiana, grand jury for one of six murders com-
mitted in the vicinity of Evansville, Indiana. The Vanderburgh County
prosecutor and police officials released statements to the press indicating
that Irvin.had confessed to the six homicides, and the news media gave
extensive coverage to the crimes and to Irvin's arrest and confession.8 4
Indiana statutory law allowed a criminal defendant charged with any
crime punishable by death the right to transfer his case to a different
jurisdiction.35 Under this provision Irvin applied for and was granted
a change of venue to Gibson County, adjacent to Vanderburgh County.
Although the Indiana statute allows only one change of venue, 6 Irvin
applied for a second transfer and made eight motions for continuances.
All were denied. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
after the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied the petitioner
habeas corpus relief.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Clark pointed out that it would be
"an impossible standard" to rule "that the mere existence of any pre-
conceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without
more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's
impartiality .... 3 Whether the nature and strength of an opinion
is sufficient to rebut the presumption of impartiality is a question of
mixed law and fact with the burden on the accused to prove actual bias.
In questions of mixed law and fact involving constitutional principles
of due process, the federal courts have a duty to adjudicate the ques-
tion. Consequently, the Court held that the court of appeals should
have independently evaluated the voir dire testimony to determine
whether any of the juror's preconceived opinions were of sufficient
magnitude to deny the accused his right to an impartial trial.39
33. 366 U.S. 717 (1961). During the same term as Irvin, the Court reversed the con-
viction of an accused whose case received adverse press publicity while the trial was
in progress and in which the jury was allowed to separate, Janko v. United States,
366 U.S. 716 (1961), rev'g 281 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1960).
34. 366 U.S. at 719-20.
35. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1305 (1956).
36. Id.
37. For the factual background, see Irvin v. State, 236 Ind. 384, 139 N.E.2d 898
(1957); Irvin v. Dowd, 153 F. Supp. 531 (1957), 251 F.2d 548 (1958), 271 F.2d 552 (1959).
38. 366 U.S. at 723.
39. Id.
1971: '
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Justice Clark observed that Irvin's case was subjected to massive press
coverage which reported not only his confession but also his past crim-
inal record. It was estimated that newspaper articles discussing aspects
of the case reached 95 percent of the homes in Gibson County.40 The
Court said, "It cannot be gainsaid that the force of this continued ad-
verse publicity caused a sustained excitement and fostered a strong
prejudice among the people of Gibson County." 41 Further, the voir
dire evidence indicated a pattern of prejudice. Two hundred sixty-
eight veniremen were excused for cause upon the trial court's determina-
tion that their opinions were fixed. Eight of the 12 jurors thought Irvin
guilty, and 90 percent of those examined on voir dire had some opinion
concerning his guilt.42 The Court was of the opinion that "[t]he in-
fluence that lurks in an opinion once formed is so persistent that it
unconsciously fights detachment from the mental processes of the
average man." 43 Although each juror had said he could set aside any
preconceived opinion and treat the accused fairly and impartially, the
Court observed that the "psychological impact requiring such a dec-
laration before one's fellows" is often responsible for such response.
"Where so many, so many times, admitted prejudice, such a statement
of impartiality can be given little weight." 44
Insofar as Irvin is the first Supreme Court case to reverse a state con-
viction on grounds of prejudicial publicity, it may appear that it set
new guidelines for courts to follow in adjudications involving voir dire
issues. Such an assumption, however, fails to recognize that much of
the language in Irvin is cast in the traditional phraseology of cases in-
volving the impartiality of jurors. Jurors, the Court said, need not
be "totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved" in a case. Any
important case "can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in
the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors
will not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the
case." 45
Thus, the Reynolds rule lives on in Irvin, which did not break alto-
gether with prior cases involving impartiality of jurors in the face of
40. Id. at 725.
41. Id. at 726.
42. Id. at 727.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 728.
45. Id. at 722.
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widespread prejudicial press publicity. 40 Indeed, many appellate cases
have relied upon Justice Clark's "totally ignorant of the facts and issues"
phrase to sustain the decisions of trial judges not to excuse jurors for
cause based on alleged actual bias.47 Both Irvin and Juelich suggest that
in some cases publicity can be so widespread and opinions of guilt so
prevalent among veniremen and jurors that courts can presume actual
bias.48 This suggestion, that under certain conditions bias may be pre-
sumed, is most pronounced in the reliance both Irvin and Juelich place
on the quantitative examinations of the voir dire.
Irvin is a good case for the application of Karl Llewellyn's "accordi-
on" theory: Precedent may be either expanded or contracted to apply to
a particular case.49 Irvin may be interpreted to mean that the traditional
Reynolds formula should govern cases involving possible jury bias, or
it may be interpreted to mean that bias may be presumed in some
situations.
Beck v. Washington50 exemplifies the interpretation of Irvin as hold-
ing that the traditional Reynolds formula should govern jury bias cases.
Beck was convicted of grand larceny in a Washington court, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. It must be presumed, the petitioner
argued, that because of widespread and adverse publicity any jury would
be biased. The Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor
or Management Field of the U.S. Senate had conducted investigations
during which the petitioner was reported to have invoked his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination approximately 210 times
in three appearances before the Committee. Beck's appearances received
widespread coverage from both the printed and electronic media, includ-
ing live television coverage. The Committee was quoted as saying that
nearly $250,000 had been taken from the funds of the International
Teamsters Union, of which Beck was president, and used for his own
personal benefit. The chairman of the Senate Committee was quoted
as saying that it was his belief that Beck had "committed many criminal
46. For the view that Irvin is within the Reynolds tradition, see Manes, Irvin v.
Dowd: Retreat from Reality, 22 LAW iN TRANsiTioN 46 (1962).
47. Illustrative of those cases which distinguish Irvin and use Justice Clark's language
to sustain a trial judge's decision is Odom v. Nash, 226 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
48. For the view that Irvin breaks with the Reynolds tradition, see Note, The
Changing Approach to "Trial by Newspaper," 38 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 136 (1963). McKay,
supra note 32, suggests that Irvin modified but did not abandon the Reynolds formula.
49. K. Llewellyn, TiE BRAmm BusfI, selection in Tim LEGAL PRocESS 43 (1961).
50. 369 U.S. 541 (1962).
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offenses." "' Not only did the state indictments against Beck receive
widespread press attention, but federal grand jury indictments for in-
come tax -evasion also received considerable press comment. Again
speaking for the Court, Justice Clark observed that by the time Beck
came to trial the news value of the case "was diminished." Other labor
leaders had begun to attract the greatest portion of press coverage, and
even page one articles about Beck "were straight news stories rather
than invidious articles which would tend to arouse ill will and vindic-
tiveness." 52 The lapse of almost five months between the indictment
and the trial and nearly nine and one-half months between Beck's ap-
pearances before the Senate Committee and the trial were long enough
for the impact of any publicity to subside. 3 Most important, of the 52
veniremen examined on voir dire, only eight admitted bias. These eight
and six others whose responses on voir dire suggested the presence of
bias were -excused. The trial judge sustained each of petitioner's chal-
lenges for cause, and the petitioner exercised each of his six peremptory
challenges. Thus, Irvin's standard of impartiality was met and even
exceeded in Beck.54
United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno5 5 exemplifies the alternate inter-
pretation of Irvin as holding that jury bias may be presumed in some
situations. In Bloeth the petitioner had been convicted of first degree
murder and sentenced to death by a New York court. The pretrial pub-
licity was widespread and highly emotional. The press referred to
Bloeth as a "Mad Killer" and reported that he had confessed to three
homicides, an assault with a claw-hammer on an elderly woman, and
at least three armed robberies. It was also reported that Bloeth had
failed a polygraph examination.56 Using the Irvin case as the standard
for judging juror impartiality, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit observed that it "must determine, from a review of the entire
voir dire, whether the extent and nature of the publicity has caused
such a build up of prejudice that -excluding the preconception of guilt
from the deliberations would be too difficult for the jury to be honestly
found impartial." 57 The publicity was not only widespread and volu-
51. Id. at 544.
52. Id. at 556.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 557. In addition, the petitioner did not challenge for cause any of the
jurors selected.
55. 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963).
56. For the factual background, see id. at 366-70.
57. Id. at 372.
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minous, but also highly inflammatory. It reached the overwhelming
majority of veniremen, 36 of the 38 -examined on the voir dire having
read about the case. Further, 31 veniremen stated that they had formed
opinions about the guilt of the accused. Of the 16 regular and alternate
jurors who were seated, eight stated that they believed the accused was
guilty, although they claimed to be able to decide the case impartially. 8
Even though nine months had elapsed between the time of the crimes
and Bloeth's trial, the court held that the time lapse between the original
publicity and the trial was not enough to blunt the impact of highly
inflammatory publicity which had reached a saturation level00 The
court reversed Bloeth's conviction, because there was too great a burden
on the jurors "in the light of the nature of the publicity, the high pro-
portion of jurors holding opinions of guilt, the length of time the opin-
ions had been held and their persistence." 60
Juelich, Irvin, Beck, and Bloeth are the major cases establishing the
criteria for judging juror impartiality. When a high proportion of the
jurors believe the defendant guilty or the voir dire suggests a pattern
of prejudice, actual bias may be presumed. Highly inflammatory pub-
licity, such as existed in Irvin or Bloeth, indicates that the trial judge
should proceed with extraordinary caution. Indeed, in cases of inflam-
matory publicity even a substantial lapse of time between the publicity
and the trial may not be sufficient to guarantee the defendant a fair and
impartial trial. In cases such as Beck a significant lapse of time may
be sufficient to protect the defendant against the deleterious aspects of
widespread publicity. When appellate courts have found prejudicial
error because jurors were biased by publicity, the overriding consid-
eration has been whether the court, in an independent -examination of
the voir dire, has found a substantial proportion of jurors with beliefs
in the guilt of the accused. While one or two jurors with tentative or
hypothetical opinions will not b'e enough to set aside a verdict on appeal,
if a large enough proportion of jurors hold such opinions or if a pattern
of prejudice is revealed in the jurors' responses on the voir dire, then
there is ground for reversal.
4Change of Venue and Continuance
Not only is the voir dire an important safeguard in its own right,
but also in most cases the trial judge will attach great importance to
58. Id. at 367-68.
59. Id. at 373.
60. Id. at 372.
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the voir dire in considering applications for change of venue or continu-
ance. Obviously, there is no purpose in moving or delaying a trial be-
cause of prejudicial publicity when the voir dire indicates that jurors
have neither exposure to such publicity nor preconceived opinions re-
garding the guilt or innocence of the accused.0 The general rule is that
the trial judge will be overruled only when it has been demonstrated
that he has clearly abused his discretion. The failure of an accused to
exercise all of his peremptory or for cause challenges is a strong indica-
tion that the trial judge did not abuse that discretion in denying a motion
for transfer or continuance.2
Publicity may be both widespread and adverse to the defendant, but
the important question is whether an impartial jury can be selected.
Accordingly, many states require, either by statute or court decision,
61. See, e.g., United States v. Armone, 363 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1966); United States
v. Moran, 236 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1956); Colosacco v. United States, 196 F.2d 165 (10th
Cir. 1952); Lias v. United States, 51 F.2d 215 (4th Cir.), aff'd per curiam 284 U.S. 584
(1931); United States v. Beadon, 49 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1931); United States v. Hinton,
268 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. La. 1967); United States v. Applegarth, 206 F. Supp. 686 (D.
Md. 1962); United States v. Kline, 205 F. Supp. 637 (D. Minn. 1962); United States v.
Hoffa, 156 F. Supp. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Carper, 13 F.R.D. 483 (D.D.C.
1953); United States v. Francis, 144 F. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1906); Corbett v. People, 153 Colo.
457, 387 P.2d 409 (1963); People v. Marsh, 403 IMI. 81, 85 N.E.2d 715 (1949); Hanley v.
State, 80 Nev. 248, 391 P.2d 865 (1964); Shapard v. State, 437 P.2d 565 (Okla. Crim.
1968); Commonwealth v. Swanson, 432 Pa. 293, 248 A.2d 12 (1968); Hagans v. State, 372
S.W.2d 946 (Tex. Crim. 1963); State v. St. Peter, 63 Wash. 2d 495, 387 P.2d 937 (1963).
There is, of course, some overlap between the above cases on change of venue and
continuance and cases dealing with juror bias; see notes 10 and 15 supra. The voir dire
cases hold that a juror can have a tentative opinion and still be fair; the venue and
continuance cases hold that the voir dire indicates whether there should have been a
change of venue or continuance. Sometimes it is held that an extensive voir dire itself
is an indication that a fair jury was chosen and that the trial judge was cautious and
careful. See People v. Carter, 15 Cal. Rptr. 645, 364 P2d 477 (1961), where all 115
veniremen had read of the case but a change of venue was denied; Application of
Palakiko, 39 Hawaii 167 (1951), where more than 100 veniremen were exhausted and
it was held that this indicated that the biased jurors were weeded out. Cf. United
States v. Moran, 236 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1956) (change of venue); United States v. Moran,
194 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1952) (continuance). Both cases found no judicial abuse of
discretion in denying motions for change of venue and continuance because there was
no difficulty in impaneling the juries.
62. See, e.g., Dranow v. United States, 307 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1962); Shushan v.
United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941); People v. Parker, 235 Cal. App.2d 100, 44
Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965); Kelley v. State, 212 So. 2d 27 (Fla. App. 1968); People v. Williams,
40 Ill. 2d 522, 240 N.E.2d 645 (1968); Bradley v. State, 245 Ind. 331, 198 N.E.2d 762
(1964); State v. Porth, 269 N.C. 329, 153 S.E.2d 10 (1967); State v. Cannon, 248 S.C. 521,
151 S.E.2d 752 (1966); Ward v. State, 427 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Crim. 1968); State v.
Truman, 124 Vt. 284, 204 A.2d 93 (1964).
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that a motion for a change of venue be supported by affidavits from resi-
dents of the community stating that the defendant cannot receive a
fair trial.6" The mere existence of the pretrial publicity is not a suffi-
cient ground for transfer or continuance.64
Many of the legal considerations that apply to cases involving jury
bias vis-a-vis the voir dire also apply to cases involving motions for
transfer or continuance. For -example, a long lapse of time between the
publicity and the trial may suggest to judges that any community prej-
udice has abated, thereby 'eliminating the need for a transfer or con-
tinuance65 In addition, the volume and quality of the publicity is a
variable to be considered. If press comment is basically factual and
accurate and does not appeal to the emotions, then it will be difficult
for the defendant to obtain a change of venue or continuance.66 As in
63. ALAs. R. rM. P. 19; Aiuz. R. CRIT. P. 202, 206; ARx. STAT. ANN. § 43-1502 (1947);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1034 (1956); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-9-5 (1963); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 911.03 (1941); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-12 (1953); IDAHO CoDE ANN. § 19-1802 (1947);
ILL. Rlv. STAT. ch. 146, § 20 (1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1301 (1956); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 778.3 (1946); K.AeN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1321 (1963); Ky. REV. STAT. § 452.230 (1962);
LA. REV. STAT. § 15:292 (1950); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 627.01 (1945); MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 2508 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. 5 545.490 (1949); MONT. REv. CoDEs ANN. § 95-1710
(1968); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1301 (1943); NEV. REv. STAT. § 174.464 (1967); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 21-5-3 (1953); N.Y. CoDE CIm. PRoc. § 5.346 (1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-85
(1951); OK.LA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 561 (1951); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-458 (1962); T-x.
CODE CRim. PRoc. art. 31.02 (1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-26-2 (1953); WAsH. REV.
CODE ANN § 10.25.70 (1950); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 956.03 (1965).
64. See, e.g., Bearden v. United States, 320 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v.
Decker, 304 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1962); Finnegan v. United States, 204 F.2d 105 (8th
Cir. 1953); Mathis v. State, 280 Ala. 16, 189 So. 2d 564 (1966); People v. Duncan, 53
Cal. 2d 824, 350 P.2d 103 (1960); State v. Cypher, 92 Idaho 159, 438 P.2d 904 (1968);
People v. Berry, 37 IMI. 2d 329, 226 N.E.2d 591 (1967); State v. Rogers, 241 La. 841,
132 So. 2d 819 (1961); State v. Lupino, 268 Minn. 344, 129 N.W.2d 294 (1964).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Armone, 363 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1966); Palakiko v.
Harper, 209 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1953); United States v. Corallo, 284 F. Supp. 240
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. Wolfson, 282 F. Supp. 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); United
States v. Thoresen, 281 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Steel v. State, 246 Ark. 74,
436 S.W.2d 800 (1969); Weekley v. State, 222 A.2d 781 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1966); Wanzer
v. State, 202 Md. 601, 97 A.2d 914 (1952); State v. Ellis, 271 Minn. 345, 136 N.W.2d
384 (1965); State v. Gallicchio, 51 N.J. 313, 240 A.2d 166 (1968); Commonwealth v.
Lopinson, 427 Pa. 284, 234 A.2d 552 (1967); Foster v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 297,
163 SE.2d 565 (1968); State v. Laabs, 40 Wis. 2d 162, 161 N.W.2d 249 (1968).
The above citations are to cases involving motions for both changes of venue and
continuances, but the standards for both are not always the same. United States v.
Dioguardi, 147 F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), suggests that some publicity may make
it necessary to grant a continuance but not to take the more extreme measure of
granting a transfer. But cf. United States v. Florio, 13 F.R.D. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
66. See, e.g., Harney v. United States, 306 F.2d 523 (1st Cir. i962) (publicity not
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cases involving jury bias, the defendant should move for a transfer or
continuance before the jury is selected or he will be deemed to have
waived his right to so move. 7
Some cases suggest that there is not as much occasion to grant a
change of venue or continuance to a defendant who is to be tried in a
metropolitan jurisdiction, for the heterogeneous composition of an urban
population enhances the prospect of obtaining jurors who have not been
-exposed to publicity."' Conversely, the close-knit character of the rural
vitriolic); United States v. Bletterman, 279 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1960) (publicity non-
inflammatory, routine); Odom v. Nash, 226 F. Supp. 855 (W.D. Mo. 1964) (reporting
narrative and factual); McClendon v. State, 196 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1967) (news reports
fair and covered same material as introduced in evidence); Schweinefuss v. Common-
wealth, 395 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. App. 1965) (news articles create no public resentment
against accused); State v. Krampotich, 282 Minn. 182, 163 N.W.2d 772 (1968) (news
reports substantially restate information in complaints); State v. Crawford, 416 S.W.2d
178 (Mo. 1967) (news reports conservative, brief, not prominently displayed); Spillers
v. State, 84 Nev. 23, 436 P.2d 18 (1968) (articles assign crime ordinary news value only).
Moreover, unfavorable publicity about a general class of events but not about a
specific criminal defendant or criminal case is not sufficient to obtain a change of venue
or continuance. See, e.g., United States v. Mesarosh, 223 F.2d 449 (3d Cir. 1955); United
States v. Flynn, 216 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1954); United States v. Stein, 140 F. Supp. 761
(S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v. Malinsky, 20 F.R.D. 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); State v.
Miles, 103 Ariz. 291, 440 P.2d 911 (1968); State v. Glenn, 429 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1968).
67. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 302 F.2d 5 (10th Cir. 1962); Geagan v. Gavin,
181 F. Supp. 466 (D. Mass. 1960); Ciucci v. People, 21 Ill. 2d 81, 71 N.E.2d 34 (1960);
State v. Hickock, 188 Kan. 473, 363 P.2d 541 (1961). Cf. United States v. Marcello,
280 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. La. 1968), where the trial judge refused to withdraw an order
transferring the case, the accused having moved for a change of venue and then having
moved to withdraw the transfer.
It has also been held that there is no violation of a federal right for an accused to be
tried without a jury when the defendant waives his right to a jury trial after a motion
for a change of venue or continuance has been denied. See, e.g., Butzman v. United
States, 205 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1953); Austin v. Peyton, 279 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Va.
1968). Cf. People v. Heirens, 4 IMI. 2d 131, 122 N.E.2d 231 (1954); Grammer v. State,
203 Md. 200, 100 A.2d 257 (1953); People v. Ryan, 28 App. Div. 2d 916, 282 N.Y.S.2d 6
(1967). Convictions were upheld where the defendants waived jury trials but did not
move for changes of venue or continuances. There is a suggestion in United States v.
Daniels, 282 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. IM. 1968) that there may be occasions when massive
publicity will allow an accused to waive a jury trial without the government's consent.
See Patron v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24
(1965). See also People v. Sepos, 16 N.Y,2d 662, 209 N.E.2d 285 (1965), aff'g 22 App.
Div.2d 1007, 254 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1964), which permitted a remand to the county court
for a hearing to determine if a televised re-enactment of the crime denied the accused
a fair trial, even though the defendant entered a guilty plea.
68. See, e.g., Rakes v. United States, 169 F.2d 739 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
826 (1948); United States v. Corallo, 284 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States
v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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or'small towfl comhunity makes it likely that widespread publicity will
have reached virtually the entire population 9
Case and statutory law also suggests that a change of venue is a meas-
ure primarily to be used when physical violence or mob activity seems
likely. At least nine states have statutory provisions which suggest that
a change of venue should be granted when "public excitement" is great
or when lawless conditions prevail.70 Many of the cases in which appel-
late courts have reversed convictions on community prejudice grounds
have involved much more than press publicity. When a state of law-
lessness prevails and the trial becomes merely a facade, then an appellate
court is on solid ground in reversing the conviction. This. is so regard-
less of whether newspaper publicity adverse to the defendant was one
of the factual conditions suggesting community prejudice.71 In other
words, press publicity may be one reason for granting a change of venue,
but quite frequently press publicity is so intermixed with other consid-
69. See State v. BeBee, 110 Utah 484, 175 P.2d 478 (1946); note 108 infra, and accom-
panying text. See also note 107 infra.
70. See ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 268 (1958); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-1501 to -1522 (1947);
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-12 (1953); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1301 (1956); Ky. REV.. STAT,
§ 452.230 (1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-5-3 (1953); TFx. CODE CrM. PROC. art. 31.02
(1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-26-3 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-224 (1950).
The New Hampshire law concerning change of venue is unique. The state Consti-
rution provides that it is
essential to the security of the life, liberty, and estate of the citizen, that no
crime or offense ought to be tried in any county than that in which it is
committed;-except in cases of general insurrection in any particular county,
when it shall appear to the judges of the superior court that any impartial
trial cannot be had in the county where the offense may be committed,
and upon their report, the legislature shall think proper to direct the trial
in the nearest county in which an impartial trial can be obtained.
N.H. CONST. art. 17.
71. The prototype of this category of cases is Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923)'.
Cf., e.g., Fouquette v. Bernard, 198 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1952); People v. McKay, 37 Cal.
2d 792, 236 P.2d 145 (1951); People v. Pfanschmidt, 262 I1. 411, 104 NE. 804 .(1914);
Jones v. State, 185 Md. 481, 45 A.2d 350 (1946); People v. Mleczko, 193 Miic. 253, 83
N.Y.S.2d 821 (1948); Williams v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 202, 283 S.W.2d 239 (1955).
See also Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951), where the Supreme Court reversed
a state conviction on the ground that the method of jury selection discriminated against
Negroes. However, the case is frequently cited as involving prejudicial press publicity
because of the concurring opinion by Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Frankfurter.
See 341 U.S. at 51-55. But cf. Cox v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 106, 234 S.W. 72 (1921),
which held that newspaper publicity is an important variable, though'not the only
one, to consider in change of venue applications. Cox also held that a change of venue
should be granted if the accused shows that a fair trial is improbable; th'iip(ssibilltr
of a fair trial need not be demonstrated. Cox, of course, is a minority view. "-
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erations that it becomes difficult to determine how much weight pub-
licity was given in the judicial decision.
Although publicity alone generally is insufficient to result in a change
of venue or continuance, there are situations where the publicity can
be so widespread and prejudicial that a change of venue or continuance
is required. In Rideau v. Louisiana,72 the United States Supreme Court
reversed the conviction of the accused whose confession to bank rob-
bery, murder, and kidnapping was broadcast over a Lake Charles, Loui-
siana, television station on three separate occasions. The trial court
denied the petitioner's motion for a change of venue and overruled the
challenges for cause of three members of the jury who testified on voir
dire that they had seen and heard Rideau's confession.3 Speaking through
Justice Stewart, the Supreme Court held that it was a denial of due
process for the trial judge not to move Rideau's trial from Calcasieu
Parish where the television broadcast originated. The televised confes-
sion "in a very real sense 'was Rideau's trial-at which he pleaded guilty
to murder. Any subsequent court proceedings in a community so per-
vasively -exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hollow formality." 74
Justice Stewart observed that the proceeding was no less a "kangaroo
court" simply because physical brutality was lacking.75
The Court found the Rideau case so lacking in due process that it did
not consider it necessary to -examine the transcript of the voir dire in
order to determine whether any juror was infected with bias.76 Due
process required "a trial before a jury drawn from a community of
people who had not seen and heard Rideau's televised interview." 77
Justices Clark and Harlan, dissenting, noted that although Rideau's
conviction might have been reversed under the exercise of the Court's
supervisory powers if the case were one arising in a federal jurisdiction,
the majority opinion failed to establish "any substantial nexus between
the televised 'interview' and petitioner's trial which occurred almost
two months later." 7s There is no ground for reversal, the dissenters
argued, unless the adverse publicity can be shown "to have fatally in-
fected the trial .. . . 7 The three jurors who saw Rideau's televised
72. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
73. Id. at 724-25.
74. Id. at 726.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 727.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 729.
79. Id.
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confession all said they could accord the accused the presumption of
innocence. Irvin v. Dowd recognized that "it is an impossible standard
to require [a jury] to be a laboratory, completely sterilized and freed
from any external factors." '0 Although Rideau was not free from such
factors, the burden of showing unfairness, according to Justices Clark
and Harlan, was not met by the accused.
I'vin and Rideau also speak for the incidental proposition that the
purpose of a trial is to ensure justice, notwithstanding state statutes lim-
iting the accused to only one change of venue or transfer to an adjacent
county or judicial district. Indiana is one of 15 states with statutes
prohibiting the defendant from obtaining more than one change of
venue."' In Irvin the Supreme Court did not consider the constitution-
ality of the Indiana statute, for the Indiana Supreme Court itself had
previously held that the courts must provide the accused a fair trial
even if a second change of venue contravenes the state statute."' Sim-
ilarly, Louisiana is one of 17 states having some kind of statutory or
constitutional provision placing geographical restrictions on the forum
to which a trial may be moved."3 The Louisiana statute provides that
80. Id. at 733. If the facts in Rideau seem extreme, cf. Latham v. Crouse, 320 F.2d
120 (10th Cir. 1963), 330 F.2d 865 (10th Cir. 1964); People v. Sepos, 16 N.Y2d 662, 209
N.E.2d 285 (1965), aff'g 22 App. Div.2d 1007, 254 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1964); People v. Martin,
19 App. Div. 2d 804, 243 N.Y.S.2d 343 (1963); People v. Luedecke, 22 App. Div. 2d
636, 258 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1965).
81. See ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 269 (1958); Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-411 (1956); ARIC.
STAT. ANN. § 43-1518 (1947); CoLO. Rrv. STAT. ANN. § 39-9-7 (1963); ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch.
146, § 26 (1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1305 (1956); KY. REV. STAT. § 452.240 (1962); LA.
REv. STAT. § 15:294 (1950); MNN. STAT. AN. § 627.01 (1945); Nv. REV. STAT. § 66.3&
(1967); N.D. CENr. CODE § 29-15-03 (1961); ORE. REv. STAT. § 14-400 (1953); SD. COMp.
LAws tit. 23, §§ 23-28-03, -05, -07 (1967); Wis. STAT. ANN . § 956.03 (1965); Wyo. R.
CuM. P. 23 (1969).
82. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721 (1961), citing Gannon v. Porter Circuit Court,
239 Ind. 637, 159 N.E.2d 713 (1959).
83. See ALA. CODE: tit. 15, § 269 (1958); ARK. CONSr. art. 2 § 10; CAL. PENAL
CoDE § 10335 (1956); IowA CODE ANN. § 778.10 (1946); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1318
(1963); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 452.210, -220 (1962); LA. REv. STAT. § 15:293 (1950); MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 277, § 51 (1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 545.430 (1949); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-1301 (1943); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-5-6 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-84 (1951);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 561 (1951); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-458 (1962); S.D. Comp.
LAws § 28-28-03 (1967); TENN. CODE A.N. § 40-2204 (1956); Tx. CODE CaM. Pxoc.
art. 31.01 (1965).
Some cases suggest that there is no point in moving a trial when the publicity is
great, for the transfer will not avoid publicity. See, e.g., Shockley v. United States,
166 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1948). Similarly, in cases involving continuance it has sometimes
been suggested that a continuance would not be useful, for the publicity would only
reappear at a later date. See, e.g., Paschen v. United States, 70 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1934).
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the transfer should be to an adjoining parish of the same judicial district
or to a parish of an adjoining district.84 In Rideau the television cover-
age of Rideau's confession reached both the judicial district in which
Rideau was tried and an adjoining judicial district.85 In light of Irvin
and Rideau, the Louisiana courts eventually moved the trial beyond an
adjacent judicial district on the ground that the state legislation was
merely "procedural legislation" and the right to a change of venue in
a case like Rideau was a "basic constitutional" guarantee.86
Not only may publicity be so pervasive and prejudicial that a change
of venue is required without showing actual prejudice, but publicity
may be so adverse and widespread that a postponement is required. In
Delaney v. United States, 7 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
held that the district court erred in refusing a continuance to the peti-
tioner whose tax bribery prosecution received widespread press com-
ment as a result of a public investigation by the House Ways and Means
Committee The Committee, the court observed, heard testimony not
relevant to the indictments pending against Delaney.8 Further, the
Committee chairman publicly accused Delaney of betraying his trust
as a public officer.8 9 The resulting publicity was not limited to Boston,
where Delaney was to be tried, but was nationwide, and included an
article in Life magazine about the investigation and testimony relating
to Delaney. 9 ° The House Committee was largely responsible for the
widespread publicity which "blackened and* discredited" Delaney's
character, since the hearings were held after Delaney's indictment but
before his trial.9 '
The court of appeals found no error in the failure of the trial court
to dismiss the indictments after widespread adverse publicity, but the
court noted that the trial judge should have foreseen the impossibility of
a fair trial being held in the foreseeable future9 2 The judge decided
correctly in granting two postponements, but it was held reversible error
to deny a third, even though he was conscientious in questioning the
jury about publicity and in cautioning them about exposing themselves
84. LA. REv. STAT. § 15:293 (1950).
85. Rideau v. State, 246 La. 451, 165 So. 2d 282 (1964).
86. 165 So. 2d at 284-85.
87. 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952).
88. Id. at 110.
89. Id. at 111.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 112.
[Vol. 13.-1
ADVERSE PRESS COVERAGE
to press comment. The court reasoned that "[o]ne cannot'assume that
the average juror is so endowed with a sense of detachment, so clear
in his introspective perception of his own mental processes, that he may
confidently exclude even the unconscious influence of his preconceptions
as to probable guilt, engendered by a pervasive pre-trial publicity." 9 3
The court of appeals saw no precedent for the Delaney case, noting
that Delaney was no ordinary instance of pretrial publicity in which the
press, through its. own initiative, published information adverse to a
criminal defendant. Instead, a committee of the United States Congress
had "caused and stimulated this massive pretrial publicity, on a nation-
wide scale." 94 It made no difference that the publicity proceeded from
the Congress rather than the Justice Department; the judicial abuse of
discretion would have been just as great had a third continuance been
denied in an atmosphere polluted by the release of information by the
prosecution 5
The court distinguished Stroble v. California96 on the ground that
the only information released by the prosecution to the press in Stroble
was the defendant's confession, which was later admitted in evidence
at the trial. In Stroble the press was responsible for initiating most of
the adverse publicity, but in Delaney the adverse publicity was initiated
by the government. 7 The Court also noted that Stroble was a state
prosecution, "concerned only with the rock-bottom requirements of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" and not with
the supervisory powers of the federal appellate courts over federal crim-
inal proceedings. "s The government imposed a burden on Delaney by
making it difficult for him to receive a fair trial and, therefore, it was
"neither right, nor in harmony with the spirit of the Sixth Amendment,
for the government to try him while the damaging effect of all that
93. Id. at 112-13.
94. Id. at 113.
95. Id.
96. In Stroble the accused argued that due process required a new trial without a
showing of actual prejudice. However, Justice Clark, speaking for the majority, observed
that the accused did not seek a change of venue, that the publicity soon abated, that the
defendant's confession became a matter of public record at the preliminary hearing, and
that the accused did not show how publication of the confession influenced his trial
when it was made public two months before the trial. There was no showing of
actual prejudice. 343 U.S. 181, 192 (1952). See also People v. Stroble, 36 Cal. 2d 615,
226 P.2d 330 (1951).
97. 199 F. 2d 107,113 (1st Cir. 1952).
-98. Id.
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hostile publicity may reasonably be thought not to have been erased
from the public mind." 9
The government, of course, may hold public investigations that might
result in publicity injurious to a criminal defendant, but the consequence
may be a postponement of a trial until the danger of bias "may reason-
ably be thought to have been substantially removed." 100 Further, the
Delaney court held that it did not matter that the defendant failed to
seek a change of venue, for the accused "is not obliged to forego his
constitutional right to an impartial trial in the district wherein the offense
is alleged to have been committed .... ,, '1o In view of the nationwide
publicity in Delaney, the failure to move for a transfer was forgiven . 2
Nor was it fatal for the accused not to exhaust his peremptory chal-
lenges. In an atmosphere -enveloped by publicity hostile to the defend-
ant, there was "little or no reason for assuming that one juror rather
than another would be more likely to be influenced, consciously or
unconsciously, by his preconceptions .... )) 103 Although each juror
said he was prepared to decide on the evidence alone, the court held
that the judgment must be vacated in view of the pervasiveness and
adverse nature of the government-produced publicity. 0 4
Despite Rideau and Delaney, the clear tendency is for appellate courts
to sustain trial judges in their refusals to move or postpone cases where
pretrial publicity exists. Changes of venue and continuances may not
be 'effective in any event since the cause celebre will attract press atten-
tion regardless of where or when the trial is conducted. The trials of
Bruno Hauptmann, Sam Sheppard, Richard Speck, and Jack Ruby
suggest that widespread publicity adverse to the accused is inevitable
when the crime is horrendous or bizarre, or when the accused or his
victim is a person of public standing. National network broadcasting
and communications by the national press services make a change of
venue a slender protection at best against prejudicial reporting. When
a continuance is granted in the cause cdlebre, reporters may write fewer
column inches but are unlikely to forget the date for which the trial
has been rescheduled. 105
99. Id. at 114.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 116.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. On change of venue and continuance see Austin, Prejudice and Change of
Venue, 68 DicK. L. Rv. 401 (1964); Bailey and Golding, Remedies for Prejudicial Pub-
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While it is true that in many cases the effectiveness of a change of
venue or continuance might be undermined by the pervasiveness of
the modern mass media, it is well to keep in mind Telford Taylor's
observation that in many cases publicity may be localized yet sufficient
to arouse considerable community interest or excitement.106 Even brutal
cr-nes may not be unusual enough to attract press comment outside a
restricted locale. A qualitative examination of the cases suggests that
there is much truth in Taylor's observation. Typically, these cases sug-
gest that a change of venue might be an effective remedy against com-
munity prejudice when the original forum is in a rural area or a small
town.
0 7
State v. BeBee'08 was representative of this type case. BeBee was
convicted of first degree murder in San Pete County, Utah. The Utah
Supreme Court observed that BeBee was said to be about 100 years old
and that he "wears long braids and dresses in a style sufficiently differ-
ent from that of the ordinary man as to attract the attention of the
casual passer-by." 109 The victim of the homicide was well known in
San Pete County, consequently the newspaper publicity was adverse
to BeBee. One newspaper headline read: "'Eyewitness Saw Lon Larsen
Shot and Killed By A Man Identified By The Sheriff As Hiram BeBee.
Why Wait?'" 01o The Utah court found no error in the trial court's
licity-Change of Venue and Continuance in Federal Criminal Procedure, 18 FED. B.J.
56 (1958); Burgess, The Efficacy of a Change of Venue in Protecting a Defendant's
Right to an Impartial Jury, 42 NounE DAmEs LAw. 925 (1967); Kimerling, Trial by
Newspaper-Abuse of Discretion in Denying Continuance, 5 ALA. L. REv. 314 (1953);
Note, Community Hostility and the Right to an Impartial Jury, 60 ComtJM. L. REv. 349
(1960); Note, Local Prejudice in Criminal Cases, 54 HARv. L. Rav. 679 (1941).
106. Taylor, Crime Reporting and Publicity of Criminal Proceedings, 66 CoLuM. L.
REv. 34, 53 (1966).
107. It is, of course, difficult to verify Taylor's hypothesis on the basis of court re-
ports alone. Yet the facts given in the following cases provide some support for the
inference that prejudice may have been great because of the rural or small town juris-
dictions in which the cases were tried. Harris v. Stephens, 361 F.2d 888 (8th Cir.
1966); People v. McKay, 37 Cal. 2d 792, 236 P.2d 145 (1951); People v. Pfanschmidt,
262 IMI. 411, 104 NE. 804 (1914); Johnston v. State, 112 Fla. 189, 150 So. 278 (1933);
Hickock v. Hand, 190 Kan. 224, 373 P.2d 206 (1962); Veney v. State, 251 Md. 182, 246
A.2d 568 (1968); Jones v. State, 185 Md. 481, 45 A.2d 350 (1946); People v. Mleczko, 193
Misc. 253, 83 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1948); State v. Sisson, 58 RJ. 200, 192 A. 209 (1937); Allen
v. State, 169 Tex. Crim. 318, 333 S.W.2d 855 (1960); Williams v. State, 162 Tex. Crirn.
202, 283 S.W.2d 239 (1955); State v. BeBee, 110 Utah 484, 175 P.2d 478 (1946).
108. 110 Utah 484, 175 P.2d 478 (1946).
109. 175 P.2d at 479.
110. 175 P.2d at 480.
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refusal to grant a change of venue, but indicated that a transfer would
have been a wise course for the trial court to follow."'
Dismissal of an Indictment or Information
The significance of Rideau and Delaney is the proposition that in
some cases prejudice may be so obvious that there need be no showing
of actual bias, and prejudice will be presumed. If there are occasions
when bias may be presumed as a result of the publicity involved, it
follows that in extreme cases the publicity could be so prejudicial and
widespread that the only effective judicial remedy would be the dis-
missal of the indictment or information against the accused. Indeed, one
court of appeals judge has made the off-the-bench suggestion that the
best remedy in highly publicized cases is to dismiss the charges against
the defendant."' No appellate court, however, seems to have followed
this express line of reasoning.""
Another argument advanced for dismissal of an indictment or infor-
mation is that a change of venue, even if effective in overcoming com-
munity prejudice, would deny the accused his right to a trial in the
county or district in which the crime was committed, and that a con-
tinuance would deny him his right to a speedy trial."14 Appellate courts
have met this argument by requiring the accused to make a choice when
constitutional rights are in conflict." 5
In addition, it has been argued that dismissal of the charges is an effec-
tive way to control governmental release of information adverse to the
accused.", If criminal cases are dismissed when officials release infor-
mation adverse to the accused, proponents say, then prosecutors will
exercise greater care in preventing the release of such information to
the press. The judicial response is that court interference with the duty
of government officials to investigate and prosecute crime and to make
public any material deemed in the public interest "could be an unwar-
111. 175 P.2d at 482.
112. Wright, Fair Trial-Free Press, 38 F.R.D. 435 (1965).
113. Trial courts, however, on occasion have dismissed indictments or informations.
For instance, Judge Gordon for the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismissed federal
indictments against ten defendants accused of destroying Selective Service records. Judge
Gordon said that only one of the 142 prospective jurors had not heard of the case.
N.Y. Times, June 12, 1969, at 9, col. 1.
114. State ex rel. Schulter v. Roraff, 39 Wis. 2d 342, 159 N.W.2d 25, 30-31 (1968).
115. State v. Woodington, 31 Wis. 2d 151, 142 N.W.2d 810 (1966).
116. State ex rel. Schulter v. Roraff, 39 Wis. 2d 342, 159 N.W.2d 25, 31 (1968).
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ranted interference with the balance of power." 117 Further, courts have
interpreted Delaney (which dealt with government-inspired, publicity)
as not containing the suggestion that dismissal is the proper remedy in
cases where the government is responsible for the publicity.118  Most
courts and judges agree with this interpretation. 119
LEGAL REMEDIES FOR TRIAL COMMENT AND COVERAGE
Remedies for Jury Exposure to Trial Publicity
- However prejudicial pretrial publicity may be to the criminal de-
fendant, there exist judicial remedies to neutralize it. The voir dire can
be used to screen potential jurors so that few who serve are biased
against the accused. If the voir dire indicates a fair jury cannot be ob-
tained, a change of venue or continuance may be effective in protecting
the defendant against community prejudice aroused by pretrial pub-
licity. But the gravity of the evil may be greater when prejudicial
publicity occurs during a trial, for the accused may no longer resort io
.pretrial protective procedure. 2 0 When press publicity reaches jurois
during a trial, the accused may move for a mistrial on the ground that
juror exposure to extrajudicial materials makes a fair trial impossible.
Of course, sequestration of the jury in criminal cases reduces the pos-
sibility that press comment will reach jurors, but locking-up the jury
is both an inconvenient and expensive undertaking. Moreover, press
comment has been known to reach even sequestered juries.' 21
117. State v. Woodington, 31 Wis. 2d 151, 142 N.W.2d 810, 818 (1966).
118. 142 N.W.2d at 817.
119. Of course, a defendant may ask that an indictment or information be' dismissed
for one or both of the following: (1) that publicity biased the grand jury against the
accused or (2) that publicity will bias a petit jury against the accused. See, e.g., United
States v. Osborn, 350 F.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1965); United States v. Zovluck, 274 F. Supp.
385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); United States v. Baker, 262 F. Supp. 657 (D.D.C. 1966); In re Mc-
Clelland, 260 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Tex. 1966); United States v. Kahaner, 204 F. Supp.
921 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); State v. Winsett, 200 A.2d 692 (Del. Super. Ct. 1964); Common-
wealth v. Morrissey, 351 Mass. 505, 222 NE.2d 755 (1967); State v. Smith, 102 N.J.
Super. 325, 246 A.2d 35 (1968).
120. Indeed, there is some indication that courts take trial publicity more seriously
than pretrial publicity, for then the opportunity to utilize pretrial protective remedies
is gone. See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 4 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1924), a case involving
the trial of 75 defendants for violation of the National Prohibition Law. The court
observed that most of the publicity appeared before the jurors were drawn, but that
-it would have been a different situation had sensational articles appeared after the
.selection process. See also Basiliko v. State, 212 Md. 248, 129 A.2d 375 (1957).
121. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 205 Tenn. 502, 327 S.W.2d 308 (1958).
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Many of the rules applicable in cases of jury exposure to trial pub-
licity are similar to those rules applicable to cases of pretrial publicity.
For example, the mere possibility that news comment reached a juror is
not sufficient to warrant a mistrial. The accused, as in the voir dire
cases, has the burden of showing that members of the jury have become
biased against him as the result of such comment. Actual bias must be
shown, not presumed. Courts will not presume that jurors read news-
paper accounts of a trial or are exposed to trial accounts by the elec-
tronic media just because there is the opportunity for such exposure."a
Even when prejudicial news articles have been found in the jury room.
itself, courts have not automatically assumed that members of the jury
have read the articles. 123 Moreover, even if jurors are exposed to press.
comment, the mere fact of this exposure may not be enough to secure a
mistrial.124 The trial judge may interrogate the jurors to determine if
122. See, e.g., United States v. Battaglia, 394 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1968); Aiuppa v.
United States, 393 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1968); Cardarella v. United States, 375 F.2d 222
(8th Cir. 1967); Massicot v. United States, 254 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1958); Ferrari v.
United States, 244 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1957); Smith v. United States, 236 F.2d 260 (8th
Cir. 1956); Cohen v. United States, 201 F.2d 386 (9th Cit. 1953); Bucher v. Krause, 200
F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1952); United States v. Weber, 197 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1952); United
States v. Griffin, 176 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1949); United States v. Keegan, 141 F.2d 248'
(2d Cit. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 325 U.S. 478 (1945); Welch v. United States,.
135 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Stewart v. United States, 300 F. 769 (8th Cir. 1924); Mc-
Henry v. United States, 276 F. 761 (D.C. Cir. 1921); People v. Lessard, 58 Cal. 2d 447,
375 P.2d 46 (1962); People v. Moore, 209 Cal. App. 2d 345, 26 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1962);
People v. Santo, 43 Cal. 2d 319, 273 P.2d 249 (1954); People v. Marino, 95 111. App. 2d 369,.
238 N.E.2d 245 (1968); Harris v. State, 249 Ind. 681, 231 N.E.2d 800 (1967); Wilson v.
State, 247 Ind. 454, 217 N.E.2d 152 (1966); State v. Sefcheck, 261 Iowa 1159, 157
N.W.2d 128 (1968); State v. Eldridge, 197 Kan. 694, 421 P.2d 170 (1966); State v. Hume,
146 Me. 129, 78 A.2d 496 (1951); State v. Losieau, 174 Neb. 320, 117 N.W.2d 775 (1962);
People v. Lynch, 23 N.Y.2d 262, 244 N.E.2d 29 (1968); People v. Agron, 10 N.Y.2d 130,
176 N.E.2d 556 (1961); Glasgow v. State, 370 P.2d 935 (Okla. Crim. 1962); State v.
Elkins, 248 Ore. 322, 432 P.2d 794 (1967); Swain v. State, 219 Tenn. 145, 407 S.W.2d
452 (1966); O'Brien v. State, 205 Tenn. 405, 326 S.W.2d 759 (1959); Johnson v. State,
421 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. Crim. 1967); Banner v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 153, 225 S.W.2d
975 (1950); State v. Harris, 62 Wash. 2d 858, 385 P.2d 18 (1963); Commodore v. State,
33 Wis. 2d 373, 147 N.W.2d 283 (1967); State v. Stevens, 26 Wis. 2d 451, 132 N.W2d
502 (1965).
123. See, e.g., Swain v. State, 219 Tenn. 145, 407 S.W.2d 452 (1966); State v. Harris,
62 Wash. 2d 858, 385 P.2d 18 (1963).
124. See, e.g., Hall v. United States, 396 F.2d 428 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Smith, 393 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1968); Malone v. Crouse, 380 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1967);
United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cit. 1965); United States v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d
459 (2d Ci. 1963); United States v. Gibas, 300 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1962); United States
v. Carlucci, 288 F.2d 691 (3d Cit. 1961); Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683 (6th Cir.
1959); Dillon v. United States, 218 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1955); Rowley v. United States, 185
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the exposure has influenced them, and the judge has wide discretion in
determining whether the jurors are impartial.',5 Even if a tentative opin-
ion is formed as a result of exposure there may not be a valid ground
for a mistrial.126
There may, of course, be exposure to news articles not inherently
prejudicial. The chances for a mistrial are slight when the news report-
ing does not arouse passion, is not inflammatory, is a factual account
of the trial proceedings, relates information already a part of the jury's
knowledge, or is routine. 127
Even if the jury is exposed to prejudicial information, the accused
may fail to obtain a mistrial if he does not call the judge's attention to
the exposure before the trial is over. The accused cannot wait until an
adverse verdict has been rendered and then move for a mistrial on the
ground that prejudicial publicity influenced the verdict.12  Some courts
have held that exposure to extrajudicial information could not prejudice
the accused because the evidence in the case was not close and evidence
of guilt was overwhelming. 129 In cases of possible or actual juror expo-
F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1950); Reining v. United States, 167 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1948); United
States v. Carruthers, 152 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1945); United States v. Hirsch, 74 F.2d 215
(2d Cir. 1934); Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1926); United States v.
Wilshire Oil Co., 282 F. Supp. 902 (D. Kan. 1968); People v. Malmenato, 14 IMI. 2d 52,
150 N.E.2d 806 (1958); People v. Genovese, 10 N.Y.2d 478, 180 N.E.2d 419 (1962);
Smith v. State, 205 Tenn. 502, 327 S.W.2d 308 (1959); Oseman v. State, 32 Wis. 2d 523,
145 N.W.2d 766 (1966).
125. See, e.g., Rowley v. United States, 185 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1950).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965).
127. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 385 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1967); United States ex rel.
Stickler v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 199 (6th Cir. 1966); United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817
(2d Cir. 1962); United States v. Feldman, 299 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1962); United States v.
Vita, 294 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 241 F.2d
925 (2d Cir. 1957); Tinkoff v. United States, 86 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1936); Miller v.
Kentucky, 40 F.2d 820 (6th Cit. 1930); Halko v. Anderson, 244 F. Supp. 702 (D. Del.
1965); United States v. Wolf, 102 F. Supp. 824 (W.D. Pa. 1952); Oxenberg v. State,
362 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1961); Davis v. State, 249 Ind. 426, 231 N.E.2d 230 (1967); Witts
v. State, 153 Neb. 784, 46 N.W.2d 158 (1951); State v. Sanchez, 79 N.M. 701, 448 P.2d
807 (1968).
128. Wangrow v. United States, 399 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1968); United States v. Lauchli,
371 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1966); Black v. United States, 353 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cit. 1965);
United States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1952); Langer v. United States, 76
F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1935); State v. Chambers, 102 Ariz. 234, 428 P.2d 91 (1967); People
-i. Richardson, 258 Cal. App. 2d 23, 65 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1968); State v. Halko, 193 A.2d
817 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963); State v. O'Donnell, 280 Minn. 213, 158 N.W.2d 699 (1968);
State v. Collins, 276 Minn. 459. 150 N.V.2d 850 (1967); State v. Lilja, 155 Minn. 251, 193
N.W. 178 (1923).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 383 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v.
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sure to extrajudicial news comment of a prejudicial nature, there is a
strong presumption that cautionary instructions are adequate to over-
come the possibility of any prejudice to the accused. 30 The assumption
is that jurors are true to their oaths and follow the trial judge's caution-
ary instructions not to expose themselves to news comment and not to
be influenced by press comment if they are exposed.
Despite the difficulties of securing a mistrial because of juror exposure
to trial publicity, there are occasions when juror exposure to publicity
so pollutes a trial as to render it unfair. The Supreme Court, in Mattox
v. United States,'3' held that a verdict should be set aside when it was
shown that a prejudicial newspaper article was read to the jury during
its deliberations. In Griffin v. United States,"32 in 1924, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed a conviction in which the Jury
had been exposed to press accounts quoting the prosecutor as saying
that the defendants wanted to 'enter into a negotiated guilty plea, but
that the prosecution had declined to make such a deal. The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 1953 reversed the conviction of a de-
fendant whose request to have the jury interrogated about a prejudicial
article appearing during the trial was denied by the trial judge. 33
The first federal case to give some solid basis to the possibility that
prejudice might be presumed in some circumstances was Briggs v. United
States,13 4 decided in 1955. Although there was no direct evidence that
any juror had read the extrajudicial publications, the court thought it
Largo, 346 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Coduto, 284 F.2d 464 (7th Cir.
1960); United States v. Richard, 209 F. Supp. 542 (D. R.I. 1962); Oxenberg v. State,
362 P.2d 892 (Alaska 1961); Sligh v. State, 171 Ga. 92, 154 S.E. 799 (1930); Oseman v.
State, 32 Wis. 2d 523, 145 N.W.2d 766 (1966).
130. See, e.g., Hillard v. Arizona, 362 F.2d 908 (9th Cit. 1966); Adjrni v. United
States, 346 F.2d 654 (5th Cit. 1965); United States v. Lornbardozzi, 335 F.2d 414 (2d
Cit. 1964); Cohen v. United States, 297 F2d 760 (9th Cit. 1962); United States v.
Postrna, 242 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v. Howell, 240 F.2d 149 (3d Cit.
1956); United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848 (2d Cit. 1952); United States v. Pisano,
193 F.2d 355 (7th Cit. 1951); King v. United States, 25 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1928); Halko
v. Anderson, 344 F. Supp. 702 (D. Del. 1965); People v. McKee, 265 Cal. App. 2d 53,
71 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1968); People v. Canard, 257 Cal. App. 2d 444, 65 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1968);
People v. Blackwell, 257 Cal. App. 2d 313, 64 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1967); Hammons v. People,
153 Colo. 193, 385 P.2d 592 (1963); People v. Hagel, 32 Ill. 2d 413, 206 N.E.2d 413 (1965);
Pacheco v. State, 82 Nev. 172, 414 P.2d 100 (1966).
131. 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
132. 295 F. 437 (3d Cit. 1924).
133. Marson v. United States, 203 F.2d 904 (6th Cit. 1953).
134. 221 F.2d 636 (6th Cit. 1955).
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"obvious that one or more of the jurors probably did." -3's Had the trial
court interrogated the jury, more prejudice might have resulted.' 36 An
accused has a right to be tried on the evidence offered in open court.
The court held that "[u] nder the circumstances there was a rebuttable
presumption that the rights of the appellant were prejudiced." 237
Briggs was followed by Carter v. United States,"" in 1956, which held
that it was error for the trial court to allow jurors to separate during a
capital case without admonishing them not to communicate with others
about the case and not to expose themselves to news accounts of the
case. In 1957, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a
conviction where prejudicial trial publicity was caused by action of
the government attorney. The court reversed the conviction even
though the jurors said they were not exposed to any of the publicity.39
The leading federal case involving jury exposure to press comment
during a trial, Marshall v. United States,140 was decided by the Supreme
Court in 1959. While Marshall was being tried for the violation of
a federal drug law, newspaper articles were published stating that the
accused had a prior criminal record and had practiced medicine with
only a $25 mail-order diploma for a degree. The trial judge had pre-
viously ruled that this information could not be introduced in evi-
dence. 4 Seven jurors read either one or both of the newspaper articles,
but all said they would not be influenced by their exposure to the
extrajudicial information and could decide the case on the courtroom
evidence alone. 42 Nonetheless, the Court invoked its supervisory powers
over the federal criminal judicial process to reverse the conviction. The
per curiam opinion noted that each judge has broad discretion in pass-
ing upon mistrial motions. The Court felt that "[g] eneralizations beyond
that statement are not profitable, because each case must turn on its spe-
cial facts." '43 In Marshall, the jury was exposed to evidence that had
been ruled inadmissible. The defendant would be no less prejudiced,
the Court said, if such inadmissible evidence were made part of the
prosecutor's case. The Court opined that the impact of such information
135. Id. at 639.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
139. Henslee v. United States, 246 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1957)
140. 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
141. Id. at 312.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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"may indeed be greater for it is then not tempered by protective
procedures." "'
United States v. Accardo145 was a significant application of Marshall.
During the selection of the jury, press comment asserted that Accardo
had connections with organized crime and referred to the accused as
"Chicago's jet-age Capone." During the trial, newspaper articles re-
counted the murder of the father of a prosecution witness, the father
having testified before the grand jury which indicted Accardo. " The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the conviction on
the ground that the trial judge did not take adequate precautions to
protect the accused from the adverse publicity. Both before and after
the jury selection, the trial judge instructed the jury to avoid publicity
concerning the case. This was held inadequate, since the sensational
publicity accorded Accardo was available to the jurors as they separated
nightly. There was no guarantee that "jurors would volunteer infor-
mation about violating the admonitions or admit that they were in-
fluenced by the publicity." 147 The judge should have conducted indi-
vidual interviews with each juror outside the presence of the others to
determine what effect, if any, the publicity had on them. 48 The press
comment could not have been introduced in evidence without preju-
dicing the accused. Its "effect would be at least as great if it reached
the jury through news accounts." 149
Not only has Marshall been applied since 1959 to reverse federal
convictions in which there was trial publicity,' 50 but state courts, both
before and since Marshall, have reversed convictions on the ground that
it was error to deny mistrials to defendants whose trials received news
coverage. Cases preceding Marshall had reversed convictions when a
newspaper article stated that two jurors would try to obtain a hung
jury,' ' when a juror's wife read a prejudicial newspaper article to
him,5  when jurors read newspaper accounts that exceeded a mere sum-
144. Id. at 313.
145. 298 F.2d 133 (7th Cit. 1962).
146. Id. at 135-36.
147. Id. at 136.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Mares v. United States, 383 F.2d 805 (10th Cit. 1967); Paschal v. United
States, 306 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Kum Seng Seo, 300 F.2d 623 (3d
Cit. 1962); Coopedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cit. 1959).
151. People v. Stokes, 103 Cal. 193, 37 P.2d 207 (1894).
152. People v. Wong Loung, 159 Cal. 520, 114 P.2d 829 (1911).
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mary of the proceedings, 53 when jurors read a newspaper article con-
taining inadmissible evidence, 54 when jurors were exposed to an article
indicating the judge believed the accused guilty,'5 5 and when the court
failed to inquire whether a prejudicial newspaper article influenced the
jury.156 Cases subsequent to Marshall have found reversible error when
jurors were exposed to extrajudicial information on the credibility of
witnesses, 57 when a press article reported the judge's order that the
defendant's past criminal record not be reported and the judge refused
to interrogate the jurors on whether they had seen or been influenced
by the article,'58 when information reached the jury that was not ad-
mitted in court,' 50 and when the jury was exposed to reports that the
defendant was also charged with the commission of three unrelated
murders. 60 While it is still a sound generalization that appellate courts
are unlikely to disturb the discretion of a trial judge in passing on a
motion for a mistrial, appellate courts, both before and since Marshall,
have realized that jury exposure to trial publicity may render a criminal
jury trial unfair.
Remedies for Prejudicial Trial Atmosphere
Prejudice may infect a criminal case during the trial as the result of
press publicity, but trial prejudice is not limited to jury exposure to
press comment. A criminal case may attract so much attention that the
courtroom atmosphere itself is one of prejudice. In the words of Jus-
tice Holmes, "Any judge who has sat with juries knows, that in spite
of forms, they are extremely likely to be impregnated by the environ-
ing atmosphere." 11"
Indeed, one of the assignments of error in the appeal of the Bruno
Hauptmann conviction was that the circumstances under which the
trial was conducted were prejudicial to the accused, although the
New Jersey Supreme Court found that the trial judge took steps to
maintain order and that there was no chaos or prejudicial atmosphere
153. State v. Caine, 134 Iowa 147, 111 N.W. 443 (1907).
154. Babb v. State, 18 Ariz. 505, 163 P. 259 (1917).
155. State v. Claypool, 135 Wash. 295, 237 P. 730 (1925).
156. McPhee v. People, 108 Colo. 530, 120 P.2d 814 (1941).
157. State v. Bowden, 62 N.J. Super. 339, 126 A.2d 911 (1960).
158. Commonwealth v. Crehan, 345 Mass. 609, 188 N.E.2d 923 (1963).
159. Quintana v. State, 158 Colo. 189, 405 P.2d 740 (1965).
160. People v. Whitmore, 45 Misc. 2d 506, 257 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup. Ct. King's County
1965).
161. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 349 (1915).
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during the trial.' The press was accommodated, for the public was
"entitled to reports of the daily happenings, and it was quite proper for
the trial judge to afford reasonable facilities for sending such reports." 163
As early as 1917 the Illinois Supreme Court had observed that it was
possibly prejudicial to the accused, and certainly not in keeping with
judicial dignity, to stop a trial to allow newsmen and movie cameramen
to take pictures of the trial participants.'" Similarly, the Supreme Court
of Maryland, in 1927, supported a trial judge's order prohibiting court-
room photography and upheld the contempt citation of a photogra-
pher for violating the rule. The court felt the order was instrumental
in preserving courtroom dignity and decorum and was necessary to
protect the accused "from an unnecessary and perhaps objectionable
degree of publicity." I' An Illinois court, in 1941, reasoning that pho-
tographing a criminal defendant and the jury during the trial might
cause jurors to attach more importance to the case than it deserved,
reversed the conviction partly because of the conduct of the trial.' 6
In 1965, in Estes v. Texas,6 ' the Supreme Court cast doubt on the
legality of any kind of courtroom broadcasting or photography. The
trial judge allowed photographers and television cameramen to cover
a pretrial hearing on the issue of whether the trial itself should
be broadcast and televised. After ruling that trial coverage by the elec-
tronic media would be permitted as long as the cameramen were not
inside the bar, the judge set October 22, 1962, as the trial date. Later,
the trial judge modified his ruling to prohibit live coverage of interro-
gation of the veniremen on voir dire, and live coverage of the witnesses.
He said that only four television cameras could be installed and that
they were not to be equipped for sound. The only news photographers
to be permitted were from the two major wire services and from the
local press, with films and photographs to be supplied to other media
representatives through a pooling arrangement.
Before the October 22 trial, one television station built, with the
court's permission, a booth in the rear of the courtroom, with an opening
162. State v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180 A. 809 (1935).
163. 180 A. at 827.
164. People v. Munday, 280 I1. 32, 117 N.E. 286 (1917).
165. Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 118, 136 A. 312, 314 (1927).
166. People v. Ulrich, 376 111. 461, 34 N.E.2d 393 (1941).
167. 381 U.S. 532 (1965). At the time of Estes, the only jurisdictions to allow court-
room television were Texas, Colorado, and possibly Oklahoma. See the discussion in
Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion. 381 U.S. at 580-81, 580-83 nn.38-41.
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for the four television cameras. The cameras were equipped to record
both film and sound and were clearly visible despite an attempt to dis-
guise the booth by painting it nearly the same color as the courtroom.
The first day's proceedings were not broadcast or televised live, but
both television sound film and radio tapes were made for later showings
and broadcasts. The next day the trial judge again modified his ruling
and prohibited any sound recordings until after all the evidence was
introduced. Not until November 7, when the trial judge permitted live
coverage of the prosecutor's arguments to the jury and the return of the
verdict, was there any live television or radio coverage. The defense
attorney objected to the photographing of the defense's argument and
summation to the jury. However, while defense counsel was speaking,
cameras photographed the judge, and the defense argument was moni-
tored with sound equipment and relayed to the television audience by
an announcer.
6 8
The Supreme Court was unable to agree whether televising trials was
prejudicial per se, but did agree that Estes' conviction lacked due process.
Delivering the opinion of the Court in a five to four decision, Justice
Clark noted that in most cases involving due process claims there is a
requirement to show "identifiable prejudice to the accused." -1 How-
ever, in some cases procedures may be employed which involve "such a
probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking
in due process." '70 In Rideau v. Louisiana, for example, there was no
showing of actual prejudice but a presumption that the trial was un-
fair. 7 ' The Court opined that it may not be possible to point to a
"specific mischief and prove with particularity wherein he (the accused)
was prejudiced;" however, television, "by its very nature, reaches into
a variety of areas in which it may cause prejudice to the accused." 172
In Rideau and other cases the circumstances were "inherently bad and
prejudice to the accused was presumed." 173 Such was the case in the
televising of the Estes trial.
Although the jury was sequestered in Estes, this did not mean that
prejudice was prevented. The televising of a trial makes it a cause
cl Mbre. The interest of the community is awakened, and the "trial
168. 381 U.S. at 556-57.
169. Id. at 542.
170. Id. at 542-43.
171. Id. at 543-44.
172. Id. at 544.
173. Id.
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immediately assumes an important status in the public press and the ac-
cused is highly publicized along with the offense with which he is
charged. Every juror carries with him into the jury box these solemn
facts and thus increases the chance of prejudice that is present in every
criminal case." 171 In addition, telecasting a trial could distract the jury,
even if the physical presence of the camera is unobtrusive, for the juror's
mind might well stray. 75
Error might result in the testimony of witnesses who know that their
testimony is being recorded for telecast.176 The trial judge might also
be impeded in his duty of ensuring the accused a fair trial because of
the distraction. The problem becomes even more serious when the judge
is an elected official, for the presence of cameras in the courtroom
"becomes a political weapon, which along with other distractions inher-
ent in broadcasting, diverts his attention from the task at hand-the fair
trial of the accused." 177
Of course, television might also have an impact on the defendant
himself. Not only might it distract the accused from the proceedings,
but televised trials are a "form of mental-if not physical-harassment,
resembling a police line-up or the third degree." 178 Courtroom television
causes a "heightened public clamor" which "will inevitably result in
prejudice. Trial by television is, therefore, foreign to our system." 179
Not only did these possibilities of error present themselves during the
Estes trial, but the several modifications of the trial judge's orders re-
specting courtroom television "made the trial more confusing to the
jury, the participants and to the viewers." 180 The result of televised
coverage of this trial was to offer "a public presentation of only the
State's side of the case." 181
Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Douglas and Goldberg,
concurred. The Chief Justice observed "that our condemnation of tele-
vised criminal trials is not based on generalities or abstract fears. The
record in this case presents a vivid illustration of the inherent prejudice
of televised criminal trials and supports our conclusion that this is the
174. Id. at 545.
175. Id. at 546.
176. Id. at 547.
177. Id. at 548.
178. Id. at 549.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 551.
181. Id.
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appropriate time to make a definitive appraisal of television in the court-
room." '82 Courtroom television, the Chief Justice argued, violates due
process because it diverts the attention of all trial participants away from
the proceedings, presents a false image of the judicial process, and de-
tracts from the dignity of courtroom proceedings, thereby influencing
the reliability of trials. Further, it singles out the defendants who are
subjected to trial under prejudicial conditions from others who do not
experience such prejudice. For these reasons, actual prejudice need not
be demonstrated. "The prejudice of television may be so subtle that it
escapes the ordinary methods of proof, but it would gradually erode
our fundamental conception of trial." Courtroom television "diverts
the trial process from its proper purpose," and must not be allowed.18 3
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Harlan spoke in less sweep-
ing terms. Justice Harlan noted that courtroom television "undeniably
has mischievous potentialities," but he argued that to ban it "would
doubtless impinge upon one of the valued attributes of our federalism
by preventing the States from pursuing a novel course of procedural
experimentation." 184 He conceded, however, that in the cause c6ebre
courtroom television is so injurious that it cannot be allowed without
denying the defendant due process. Noting that "the impact of televi-
sion on a trial exciting wide popular interest may be one thing; the
impact on a run-of-the-mill case may be quite another," '85 and that
closed circuit television might be used either to make a record of the
case or for use in educational institutions,'8 6 Justice Harlan made it clear
that his vote with the majority was based only on the circumstances sur-
rounding the highly publicized trial in question. Harlan said the resolu-
tion of issues involving courtroom television should await the adjudica-
tion of those issues. He added, "The opinion of the Court necessarily
goes no farther, for only the four members of the majority who unre-
servedly join the Court's opinion would resolve those questions now." 1,1
Justice Stewart dissented, joined by Justices Black, Brennan, and
White. There was no showing, he said, that any member of the jury
was influenced by television coverage, and there was no proof that the
182. Id. at 552.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 587.
185. Id. at 590.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 591.
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trial was conducted any differently with television coverage than it
would have been had the electronic media been excluded. 8
Justice White also wrote a dissenting opinion, observing that the
sweeping language in the Court's opinion "in effect precludes further
opportunity for intelligent assessment of the probable hazards imposed
by the use of cameras at criminal trials." 189 Judicial experience with
courtroom television is not great enough to "justify a prophylactic rule
dispensing with the necessity of showing specific prejudice in a particular
case." 190 Justice Brennan observed that only four Justices agreed to
the broad rule that "televised criminal trials are constitutionally infirm,
whatever the circumstances." '"" Therefore, Justice Brennan concluded
that "today's decision is not a blanket constitutional prohibition against
the televising of state criminal trials." 192
PREVENTIVE LEGAL REM.EDIES RELATING TO PRETRIAL AND
TRIAL PUBLICITY
In a sense, all of the judicial remedies discussed above are ex post
facto; that is, they can be used to detect already existing prejudice or
to set aside a conviction, but they do not prevent bias from entering the
criminal justice process. Thus, the voir dire can be used to screen out
prospective jurors who appear to be already biased against the accused.
When the setting for a criminal trial has become infected with bias or
hostility toward the accused, the court may try to escape the prejudice
by moving the trial to a new forum or by granting a continuance.
When a juror has been exposed to prejudicial press comment during a
trial (or when there is a strong probability that he has been exposed),
the judge may avoid such prejudice by granting a mistrial. Similarly,
when the conduct of the trial itself is disturbed by the press, the judge
may grant a mistrial. But all of these remedies lack preventive qualities,
for they are designed to deal with situations where either prejudice
already exists or where there is a strong probability of prejudice. The
ensuing discussion focuses on remedies which attempt to prevent the
operation of factors which would bias jurors.
188. Id. at 613.
189. Id. at 616.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 617.
192. Id.
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Exclusion of Newsmen from the Courtroom
Considerable attention has been directed toward the American Bar
Association's suggested preventive remedy that newsmen be excluded
from the courtroom during both pretrial hearings and portions of the
trial itself when the danger of prejudicial reporting is great.1' 3 There is
historical precedent for this approach in United States v. Holmes.'94 In
1841 the American ship William Brownz, with 65 passengers and a crew
of 17, struck an iceberg. The captain left 31 passengers on the sinking
ship while the crew and the remaining passengers found refuge on life
boats. Later, 14 men and two women passengers were thrown over-
board from the life boats, but all members of the crew remained. 195 The
resulting case was described as one "replete with incidents of deep
romance, and of pathetic interest." 196 Fearful of the results of wide-
spread press attention which he expected to attend the opening of the
trial, and unable to 'employ the contempt power as a result of an 1831
act of Congress, 1 7 the trial judge decided to regulate the admission of
persons attending the trial and thereby exclude the press. However, the
judge agreed to admit the press on the condition that newsmen suspend
the publication of any news until the trial was over. 98
Certainly, there are occasions when attendance at a trial may be
restricted. Members of the general public who are young, or who show
extraordinary interest in salacious testimony, may b-e excluded from
trials involving public morals. o90 The courtroom may be cleared of dis-
orderly persons, 200 and the court may restrict the number attending a
trial to the number of seating spaces available.20' If a witness is embar-
193. REARDON REPoRT 8-12 (1966).
194. 26 F. Gas. 360 (No. 15,383) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842).
195. Id. at 360-62.
196. Id. at 363.
197. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402 (1966). Cf. Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941);
Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918). For an excellent treatment
,of the development of the law of constructive contempt in federal courts, see Frank-
furter and Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "In-
ferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 H1Aiv. L. Rav. 1010 (1924)
198. 26 F. Gas. 360, 363 (No. 15,383) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842).
199. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 26 Idaho 609, 144 P. 784 (1914); Carter v. State, 99
Miss. 435, 54 So. 734 (1911).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965).
201. See, e.g., State v. Saale, 308 Mo. 573, 274 S.W. 393 (1925). Cf. Roberts v. State,
100 Neb. 199, 158 N.W. 930 (1916), which reversed a murder conviction in part because
a trial was transferred from the court to a theater.
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rassed to speak before a public gathering, attendance at the trial may
be restricted. 2
However, attempts to restrict press attendance at pretrial or trial
proceedings may contravene the sixth amendment's guarantee of a pub-
lic trial. The authorities disagree as to how far the courts can go in
restricting attendance at a trial and whether the public trial guarantee
is for the benefit of the accused or of the public-at-large, 0 3 but there
is common agreement that members of the press should be permitted
to attend trials even when other members of the general public are
excluded.204 The case law does not seem to indicate whether the judge
may temporarily exclude members of the press from a trial while he
hears testimony in the absence of the jury to determine admissibility.
The public trial problem becomes more complex when consideration
is given to barring the press from pretrial hearings on probable cause,
bail, and the exclusion of evidence. Not only does the Reardon Report
recommend that the press on occasion be excluded from such pretrial
hearings,205 but statutes of six states make it mandatory for the magistrate,
upon the request of the accused, to exclude the general public, including
the press, from preliminary hearings.200 Only a few cases deal with the
question, and two recent cases point in different directions.
In 1966, the Arizona Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition
against a trial judge who had ordered the press excluded from a pretrial
202. See, e.g., Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956).
Cf. Baker v. Utecht, 161 Fad 304 (8th Cit. 1947).
203. The majority of cases hold that a blanket exclusion of the general public from
a criminal trial is a denial of a public trial and that no prejudice to the accused need be
shown. See, e.g., United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cit. 1948); Tanksley v.
United States, 145 F.2d 58 (9th Cit. 1944); Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394 (8th Cir.
1917).
But in United Press Association v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954), it
was held that the press and public at large possess no enforceable right to insist on
a public trial. Cf. People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954). However, in
E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896 (Cuyahoga County Ct.
of Appeals 1955), it was held, though the case was moot, that the press has a remedy
through the writ of prohibition to enforce its right to a public trial.
204. For discussions of the public trial issue, see Douglas, The Public Trial and the
Free Press, 33 RocKY MT. L. REv. 1 (1960); Krueger, Public Trial in Criminal Cases,
52 MicH. L. REv. 128 (1953); Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 381
(1932); Wiggins, The Public's Right to Public Trial, 19 F.R.D. 25 (1955); Note, The
Accused's Right to a Public Trial, 49 COLuM. L. REv. 110 (1949).
205. REARDONREPORT8 (1966).
206. See ARiz. R. CRiM. P. 27 (1968); CAL. PENAL CODE § 868 (1956); IDAHO CODE ANN.
i 19-811 (1947); MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 95-1202 (1968); NEv. REv. STAT. § 171.204
(1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-13 (1953).
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habeas corpus hearing which reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence
upon which the defendant had been bound over.207 The court, holding
that the hearing was part of a public trial and that the action by the
judge was a violation of the prohibition against prior restraint of the press,
stated that the "accused, by request, may not foreclose the right of the
people and the press from freely discussing and printing the proceed-
ings held in open court." 208 Thus, the press exclusion order violated
the freedom of the press provision of the Arizona Constitution.0 Con-
trary to the Arizona decision is Azbill v. Fisher,210 in which the Nevada
Supreme Court upheld a statute21 allowing the defendant to request the
removal of the press from the preliminary hearing and ruled that it
was reversible error for the judge not to obey the legislative mandate.
The Azbill case should be compared to a 1967 federal district court case
holding that the defendant had no right to waive a public hearing on
the suppression of evidence, even though potential jurors might be
prejudiced by the resultant publicity;212 the court was careful to note
that such a rule might not apply to actions other than the anti-trust
prosecution involved.213
There is no certainty that legal authorization to close pretrial hearings
or portions of trials to the press will result in judges doing so. Geis
observes that many practitioners of criminal justice administration "are
apparently totally unaware" of the statutory authority in six states
which enables judges to close preliminary hearings. 4 For all practical
purposes the statutes have remained dead letters on the books.
In England, the magistrate at a probable cause hearing has the author-
ity to close the examination, but, despite this authorization, the threat
of press reporting prejudicial to the accused has been more likely to
occur at the pretrial probable cause examination than at any other point
in the process. Widespread press publicity, for instance, surrounded the
probable cause hearing of Dr. John Bodkin Adams. At the hearing the
press reported the testimony concerning the death of three of Dr.
207. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594 (1966).
208. 418 P.2d at 597. Cf. People v. Pratt, 27 App. Div. 2d 199, 278 N.Y.S.2d 89 (1967);
note 350 infra and accompanying text.
209. 418 P.2d at 597.
210. 84 Nev. 414, 442 P.2d 916 (1968).
211. NEv. REv. STAT. § 171.204 (1967).
212. United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 274 F. Supp.
790 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
213. Id. at 795.
214. Gels, Preliminary Hearings and the Press, 8 U.CL.A. L. REv. 397, 409 (1961).
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Adams' patients, but Dr. Adams was later tried for only one homicide.216
There is no evidence to suggest that American magistrates will avoid
similar pressures to keep preliminary hearings open to the general public,
even assuming they have the legal authority to close such hearings. 1
Although the Supreme Court has not dealt with the constitutionality
of restricting press attendance at pretrial hearings and examinations, it
has provided strong support for the proposition that courtrooms should
remain open to the general public. In re Oliver,217 decided in 1948,
involved a contempt conviction arising out of an investigation by the
Michigan one-man grand jury. The Michigan judge (also the one-man
grand jury), in a proceeding from which the press and general public
were excluded, had held Oliver in contempt on the grounds that he did
not believe Oliver's testimony in view of other secret testimony that at
least one previous witness had given." 8 Stating that the legality of the
one-man grand jury was not in question, Justice Black observed that
the necessity for grand jury secrecy has "never been thought to justify
secrecy in the trial of an accused charged with violation of law for
which he may be fined or sent to jail." 219 Although the judge conduct-
ing the grand jury investigation may be performing a judicial role, the
due process clause applied once "the judge-grand jury suddenly [made]
a witness before it a defendant in a contempt case." 220 The Court was
"unable to find a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera
in any federal, state, or municipal court during the history of this
" 221
country.
Judicial Contempt Power and Court Rules Prohibiting the Release of
Information
Although the judicial contempt power cannot undo the harm that
may have been caused by adverse publicity to the criminal defendant,
the threat of a contempt citation may serve to deter pretrial or trial press
comment. However, the use of the contempt power against newsmen
for pretrial or trial publicity may violate the first amendment's guaran-
215. Id. at 401-02.
216. Note, Controlling Prejudicial Publicity by the Contempt Power: The British
Practice and Its Prospect in American Law, 42 NoTRE DAME LAW. 957, 963 (1967).
217. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
218. Id. at 259-60. Cf. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960).
219. Id. at 264.
220. Id. at 265.
221. Id. at 266.
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tee of a free press. The Supreme Court has held that the use of the
contempt power will not b'e sustained unless the questionable press com-
ment presents a clear and present danger that can be averted only
through the use of the power. This principle has been elucidated in
Bridges v. California,222 where the Court overturned the contempt
conviction of the petitioner, saying that the clear and present danger
test contains the "worldng principle that the substantive evil must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before
utterances can be punished." 223 Although the Bridges opinion did not
rule out the possibility that a carefully drafted contempt statute might
withstand constitutional scrutiny,"4 the Bridges doctrine has been reaf-
firmed in subsequent decisions.
In Pennekamp v. Florida 5 the Court overturned the contempt con-
viction of both the Miami Herald and its associate editor after the pub-
lication of editorials critical of the judges of a state court. Justice Reed
noted that Bridges sets "reasonably well-marked limits around the power
of courts to punish newspapers and others for comments upon or criti-
cism of pending litigation." 226 Although suggesting that there may
be cases where the contempt power could be called upon to "protect
the interests of prisoners and litigants . . . from unseemly efforts to
pervert judicial action," the Court held that in borderline cases freedom
of expression "should be given the widest range compatible with the
essential requirement of the fair and orderly administration of justice."227
The Court adopted the standard that to sustain a contempt conviction
on the ground that a clear and present danger is present, "a solidity of
evidence should be required... ." 2 In Pennekamp the published com-
ment was directed toward the attitudes of elected judges toward crim-
222. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
223. Id. at 263.
224. "[Tlhe legislature of California has not appraised a particular kind of situation
and found a specific danger sufficiently imminent to justify a restriction on a particular
kind of utterance." Id. at 260-61 (Emphasis supplied).
There have been suggestions for legislation authorizing courts to hold newsmen and
officials in contempt in certain situations. See, e.g., Meyer, Free Press v. Fair Trial:
The Judge's View, 41 NDL. RFv. 14 (1964); Sigourney, Fair Trial and Free Press-
A Proposed Solution, 51 MAss. L.Q. 117 (1966); Weclew, Fair Trial-Equal in Value
to Free Press, 16 Dr PAUL L. REV. 353 (1967); Will, Free Press v. Fair Trial, 12 DE PAUL
L. REv. 197 (1963); Comment, The Case Against Trial by Newspaper: Analysis and
Proposal, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 217 (1962).
225. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
226. Id. at 334.
227. Id. at 347.
228. Id.
19711
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
inal defendants, and the Court felt the effect of such comment on juries
"is too remote for discussion." 229 Since the press comment did not
bear on evidence in the judicial proceeding, the Court found none of
"the clearness and immediacy necessary to close the door of permissible
public comment." 230
Craig v. Harney231 reversed the contempt conviction of the petitioner
who had been editorially critical of the trial judge's decision in a civil
case. The Court again relied on the clear and present danger doctrine,
finding no "imminent or serious threat to a judge of reasonable forti-
tude." 23 The Court stated that the danger stemming from free com-
ment "must not b'e remote or even probable; it must immediately im-
peril." 23 The mere fact that the language was vehement did not make
it punishable through the judicial contempt power. Justice Douglas
noted that "the law of contempt is not made for the protection of judges
who may be sensitive to the winds of public opinion." 234
Bridges, Pennekamp, and Harney did not involve jury trials, and thus
did not answer the question whether the judicial contempt power might
reach similar press comment in criminal cases involving jury trials. In
1960, in Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. State,233 the Georgia Supreme
Court reversed the contempt conviction of the petitioner for the pub-
lication of newspaper articles in the Atlanta Journal and Atlanta Consti-
tution giving the past criminal record of a defendant described by the
press as "'formerly Georgia's number one wanted man.'" The court
recognized that there may be occasions when the contempt power can
reach newspaper publications, but the newspaper corporation was not
required to anticipate that the publication would reach the jurors and
thereby interfere with the trial. The press "had a right to expect that the
jury would have been kept together until the conclusion of the trial
or otherwise properly instructed upon being permitted to disperse." 236
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Baltimore Radio Show, Inc.
229. d. at 348.
230. !d. at 350.
231. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
232. Id. at 375.
233. Id. at 376.
234. Id.
235. 216 Ga. App. 399, 116 S.E.2d 580 (1960).
236. Id. at 405, 116 S.E.2d at 584. See also Worcester Telegram & Gazette, rnc. v.
Commonwealth, 354 Mass. 578, 238 N.E.2d 861 (1968), and Shaw v. Commonwealth, 354
Mass. 583, 238 N.E.2d 876 (1968), where contempt convictions for the publication of
inadmissible evidence were reversed.
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v. State. 17 Several Baltimore radio stations had been convicted of con-
tempt for broadcasts prejudicial to a* defendant accused of first degree
murder in the stabbing death of an eleven-year-old girl. The defendant
waived his right to a jury trial on the ground that he could not get a
fair trial because of the widespread adverse publicity.3 s Among other
items, the broadcasts reported that the accused had confessed to the
crime and had been charged with or suspected of past assaults. On
appeal, the Maryland Supreme Court reversed the contempt conviction
of the radio stations, citing Bridges, Pennekamp, and Harney as author-
ity.' Although those cases did not involve jury trials, they did involve
"publications calculated and designed to influence the court's deci-
sion." 240 The court felt it would not b'e sound to argue that the Supreme
Court would view the circumstances differently in a situation involving
juries. There was no evidence of prejudice as a result of the broad-
casts, and the factors did not meet the standard that "requires more than
an inherent or reasonable tendency to prejudice, or even a probability
that it will do so." 241 Further, the court reasoned that the judiciary
is not "immune to human influences calculated to affect the rest of
mankind," and many jurors "by training and character are capable of
the same firmness and impartiality as the judiciary." 2 12
The authority of judges to cite newsmen for contempt for publishing
comments which threaten the right of an accused to a fair jury trial
is uncertain at best. It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will
reverse Bridges, for as late as 1962 the Court invoked the clear and
present danger test to reverse the contempt conviction of a sheriff candi-
date iMi Bibb County, Georgia, who publicly charged a judge with racial
agitation during the election campaign.4 3 The state judge had im-
paneled a grand jury and charged it to investigate both "'an inane and
inexplicable pattern of Negro bloc voting'" and also "'rumors and
accusations' that candidates for public office had paid large sums of
money to get the Negro vote. 44 The Court, in reversing the sheriff's
contempt conviction, noted that the Georgia Court of Appeals gave
lip service to the clear and present danger test but failed to cite or
237. 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
238. Id. at 316, 67 A.2d at 504.
239. Id. at 323-26, 67 A.2d at 507-09.
240. Id. at 323, 67 A.2d at 508.
•241. Id. at 331, 67 A.2d at 508-09.
242. Id. at 325, 67 A.2d at 511.
243. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 379 (1962).
244. Id. at 376.
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discuss Bridges, Pennekamp, or Harney 45 Nor was there any indica-
tion how the publication of the sheriff's remarks interfered with either
the grand jury or the general administration of justice. The Court
declared that in the absence of a showing of "substantive evil actually
designed to impede the court of justice," the petitioner's remarks are
entitled to the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments. 40
If the federal courts were to abandon Bridges or to distinguish it and
allow the exercise of the judicial contempt power in criminal cases
involving jury trials, there is no guarantee that trial judges would be
willing to use the contempt power to protect defendants from adverse
press comment. When the constructive contempt power was constitu-
tionally permissible, it was rarely used to protect a defendant, but rather
to protect judges from critical publications; the contempt power was
invoked most often in cases involving "scandalizing" the court. Nelles
and King in their classic examination of the constructive contempt
power between 1831 and 1928 found, out of 58 reported cases, only
15 in which the contempt power was exercised in cases involving
jury trials, while 42 cases involved publications impugning the fairness,
independence, or integrity of a judge or court.247 Most of the cases also
involved heated political affairs and were civil rather than criminal in
nature
48
Judges work within a political environment, making it unlikely that
they would be willing to use the contempt power against the media in
most criminal cases. Moreover, the protection that a restored judicial
power of constructive contempt would offer the criminal defendant
would be marginal. The constructive contempt remedy is only exercised
after a publication has been made, and the ex post facto exercise of such
power is usually unable to undo what harm may already have been
245. Id. at 387.
246. Id. at 389.
247. Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 COLuM. L.
Rxv. 525, 548-49 (1928). A recent count of 21 reported cases since Bridges (excluding
those which went to the United States Supreme Court) showed that state courts in 20
of these cases held the publication not to be contemptuous. Barist, The First Amend-
ment and Regulation of Prejudicial Publicity-An Analysis, 36 FOROHAM L. REv. 425, 430
(1968).
248. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918), is perhaps the
prototype of the kind of constructive contempt case most often decided by American
courts. For a list of cases, see Nelles and King, supra note 247 at 554-62.
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caused by the publication.249 This is a major weakness of the construc-
tive contempt power under English law.250
Use of Court Rules Prohibiting Release of Information
Although the use of the contempt power against newsmen may be
of doubtful legality, courts seem to be on firmer ground when promul-
gating rules to govern the release of information by witnesses and coun-
sel in criminal cases. The Reardon and other reports suggest that courts
may exercise control over the extrajudicial statements of participants
in criminal cases.2 51
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in State v. Van Duyne, announced
that the Canons of Professional Ethics should be interpreted "to ban
statements to news media by prosecutors, assistant prosecutors and their
lawyer staff members, as to alleged confessions or inculpatory admis-
sions by the accused, or to the effect that the case is 'open and shut'
against the defendant, and the like, or with reference to the defendant's
prior criminal record, either of convictions or arrests." 252 The court
also included statements by law enforcement personnel not members of
the bar as "warrant[ing] discipline at the hands of the proper authori-
ties." 25 The New Jersey court applied the Van Duyne principle in
State v. Kavanaugh-S4 by revoking the permission of defense attorney
F. Lee Bailey to appear pro hac vice for the accused as a result of extra-
judicial statements Bailey had made in a pending criminal case, thus
applying a punitive rather than a preventive measure.
There have been other isolated cases dealing with the promulgation
of court rules designed to prevent prosecution and defense lawyers and
249. Goldfarb, The Varieties of the Contempt Power, 13 SYRAcusE L. REv. 44, 73
(1961).
250. Id. For a discussion of the law of constructive contempt in England, see Cowen,
Prejudicial Publicity and the Fair Trial: A Comparative Examination of American, Eng-
lish, and Commonwealth Law, 41 IND. L.J. 69 (1965); Gillmor, Free Press and Fair Trial
in English Law, 22 WAsu. & LEE L. REv. 17 (1965): Goodhart, Newspapers and Con-
tempt of Court in English Law, 48 HARy. L. REv. 885 (1935).
251. Special Committee on Radio, Television and the Administration of Justice of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, FREEDom OF THE PRESS AND FAr
TRIAL-FNAL REPORT WiTH RECOMMENDATIONS 14-26 (1967); Committee on the Opera-
tion of the Jury System of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Report of the
Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue,
45 F.RD. 391 (1969); REARDON REPORT 5-7 (1966).
252. 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964).
253. 204 A.2d at 852.
254. 52 N.J. 7, 243 A.2d 225 (1968).
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others from releasing information to the news media. A trial court in
Orlando, Florida, issued a court rule which provided that the news media
should not report testimony or evidentiary features of a case unless
such information has been introduced into evidence in the presence of
the jury.25 The rule also prohibits the release of such information by
the prosecution, defense, police, and other officials.256 Recently, a Los
Angeles County trial court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting
officials from disclosing information to the press during the prearraign-
ment phase of a criminal proceeding, but a California appellate court
ruled that the trial court did not have the authority to issue such an
injunction.57 The recent adoption of the Reardon Report by the Amer-
ican Bar Association may have paved the way for further developments
in this area.258
SHEPPARD V. MAXWELL
The preceding survey of the law on the fair trial-free press issue illus-
trates the gradual judicial adoption of new legal guidelines for cases
involving possible prejudice as the result of press coverage. As the law
has developed, the requirement of demonstrating actual prejudice to the
accused has been replaced with the standard that some news coverage
and courtroom procedures are inherently prejudicial and bias may be
presumed. Sheppard v. MaxwelP 59 is the culmination of this trend.
Sam Sheppard's case was one of the most famous causes ce'lebres in
the history of trials. "Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense
were combined in this case in such a manner as to intrigue and captivate
the public fancy to a degree perhaps unparalleled in recent annals," the
Ohio Supreme Court observed in upholding Dr. Sheppard's convic-
tion.260 Dr. Sheppard's pregnant wife, Marilyn, had been discovered
bludgeoned to death July 4, 1954, in the couple's fashionable suburban
255. State ex rel. Sentinel Star Co. v. Lambeth, 192 So. 2d 518, 520 (Fla. App. 1966).
256. Id.
257. County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. App. 2d 670, 62 Cal. Rptr.
435 (1965). See also the discussion on the rules adopted by the Wake County, N.C.,
Superior Court in Note, Prejudicial Publicity in Criminal Proceedings, 45 N.C. L. REv.
201 (1966).
258. The REARDON REPORT standards, as they relate to lawyers, were incorporated into
the new A.B.A. CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY, adopted August 12, 1969, by the
House of Delegates to become effective for A.B.A. members January 1, 1970. See DR
7-107 of the Code.
259. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
260. State v. Sheppard, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d 340, 342 (1956).
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home. Suspicion centered about Sheppard from the first. He was ar-
rested July 30, 1954, indicted August 17, and convicted of murder in
December of that same year.
From the day of the murder until Sheppard was convicted, press
coverage of the crime was massive and largely adverse to Sheppard.
Newspaper articles published in three Cleveland newspapers during this
time filled five volumes.2 ' Even before Sheppard's arrest, one news-
paper editorial proclaimed, "Why Isn't Sam Sheppard in Jail?" A sep-
arate editorial said Sheppard had been "prove [n] under oath to be a
liar." 2 62 Another said Sheppard should "have b'een subjected instantly
to the same third-degree to which any person under similar circum-
stances is subjected." 263
Jurors were exposed to both pretrial and trial publicity. On the voir
dire every juror except one testified to having read newspaper accounts
of the case or listened to broadcasts about it.2 64 During the voir dire
one newspaper story was headlined, "But Who Will Speak For Mari-
lyn?" Cleveland newspapers printed verbatim accounts of the trial
proceedings, including objections raised by counsel and rulings by the
judge, and seven of the 12 jurors received at least one Cleveland news-
paper in their homes. 25 The day before the verdict was announced,
jurors were divided into two groups to pose for photographers.266 Even
when the jurors were sequestered for five days and four nights during
their deliberations, they were permitted to make telephone calls from
the bailiff's rooms. 2 7
Despite the extensive publicity, on only one occasion during the trial
were jurors asked whether they were exposed to and influenced by
media comment. Walter Winchell made a broadcast in which he claimed
that a woman under arrest in New York City for robbery had said
that she was a former mistress to Sheppard and had given birth to his
child. Two jurors admitted in open court that they had heard the broad-
cast, but said it would not influence them. The trial judge denied a
261. 384 U.S. at 342. The facts in Sheppard as presented here are all drawn from the
Supreme Court opinion. For an excellent survey of the publicity involved in the case
see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707, 756-67 (6th Cir. 1965). See also the journalistic
account by P. HoLmEs, THE SHEPPA D MURDER CASE (1961).
262. 384 U.S. at 341.
263. Id. at 339.
264. Id. at 345.
265. Id. at 344-45.
266. Id. at 345.
267. Id. at 349.
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motion for a mistrial, saying he did not know how such an incident
could have been prevented. 268
The conduct of the trial was also a major element in the case. A spe-
cial table to accommodate 20 newsmen was placed inside the bar during
the trial, with one end of the table less than three feet from the jury
box. The first three rows of benches behind the bar were also reserved
for newsmen. Telegraphic equipment and private telephone lines were
installed in rooms off the courtroom so that it would be more con-
venient for newsmen to report their stories. One broadcasting station
was permitted to establish broadcasting facilities in a room next to the
one where the jury was housed during recesses and where it conducted
its deliberations. From this room newsmen made broadcasts throughout
the trial, including the period of jury deliberations.269
Photography was not allowed when the court was in session, but
newsmen were allowed to photograph in the courtroom during recesses.
In addition, motion picture cameras occasionally recorded the parti-
cipants in the trial as they entered and left the courthouse. One televi-
sion broadcast featured an interview with the trial judge. The corridors
outside the courtroom were crowded with newsmen who took still and
moving pictures of trial participants, including veniremen during the
selection of the jury. Sheppard himself was the subject of much pho-
tography, and was surrounded by newsmen when he was brought to
the courtroom about ten minutes before each session began. 270
During the nine-week trial the movement of reporters in and out
of the courtroom created so much noise that at times it was difficult to
hear witnesses or counsel, even though a loudspeaker system had been
installed. Sheppard and his lawyer were often unable to engage in con-
fidential conversations because of the presence of newsmen within the
bar. When the attorneys wished to raise a point outside of the jury's
hearing, it was necessary to go to the judge's chambers. So many news-
men crowded inside the judge's anteroom that it was often difficult for
the judge and counsel to return to the courtroom. Frequently, news-
men would publish accounts of discussions between the judge and coun-
sel held in chambers. Since jurors were not sequestered, these discussions
made in the absence of the jury nonetheless became available to the
urors.
2 71
268. Id. at 348, 357.
269. Id. at 343.
270. Id. at 344.
271. Id.
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Among the 37 assignments of error raised on appeal to the Cuyahoga
County Court of Appeals, one urged that it was reversible error for
the trial court to deny a change of venue to the accused, another that
it was prejudicial error to deny a continuance, and a third that the
publicity denied Sheppard a fair trial 7  The court of appeals cited the
rule that mere publicity does not indicate prejudice in the absence of
any showing that jurors were in fact influenced by publicity, and held
that there was no ground for a mistrial when no actual jury misconduct
was shown.2 73
To the Ohio Supreme Court, the trial was a "Roman holiday," but
it nonetheless affirmed the conviction. 7 4 The court held that it was
within the sound discretion of the trial court to refuse each of the eight
motions for a change of venue.2 5 However, Judge Taft, joined by
Judge Hart, dissented on the ground that there was error in the court's
charge to the jury and in the admission of hearsay evidence. The dis-
sent also pointed out that a second trial could be conducted in less of
a "Roman holiday" atmosphere, since much of the suspense present in
the first trial would be lacking in a second 7
Ten years after his conviction Sheppard won a writ of habeas cor-
pus.177 Chief Judge Weinman observed that even though only 14 of
the 72 veniremen said they had prejudged the case, "the publicity
was so prejudicial ...that the assurances of the jurors must be dis-
regarded." 278 The Supreme Court in Rideau v. Louisiana,79 Weinman
commented, did not examine the jurors' voir dire. The prejudicial effect
of the publicity "was so manifest that no jury could have been seated
... in Cleveland which would have been fair and impartial regardless
of their assurances or the admonitions and instructions of the trial
judge." "0 The trial publicity was as prejudicial as the pretrial publicity,
Weinman noted, so much so "that no admonition or charge of the
court could vitiate the effect of that publicity." 281 Not only were the
jurors not questioned about exposure to the trial publicity, but the court-
272. State v. Sheppard, 100 Ohio App. 345, 128 N.E2d 471, 476-78 (1955).
273. 128 NE.2d at 480-82.
274. State v. Sheppard, 163 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d 340, 342 (1956).
275. 135 N.E.2d at 343.
276. 135 NE.2d at 352-53.
277. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964).
278. Id. at 59.
279. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
280. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37, 60 (S.D. Ohio 1964).
281. Id. at 63.
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room atmosphere itself was prejudicial because so many newsmen were
accommodated. Segments of the press were hostile to the accused, and
the practice of running photographs of jurors and the judge was a
conscious attempt on the part of the press to create a climate favorable
to the prosecution. -82
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, however, reversed.23
Judge O'Sullivan, speaking for the court, said that the accused must
demonstrate the constitutional vice in his conviction.28 4 An independent
evaluation of the voir dire, as required by Irvin v. Dowd,8 5 suggested
to the court that no prejudice resulted. Rideau and Irvin were distin-
guished: Unlike Sheppard there was publication of the defendants'
confessions in Rideau and Irvin. In Irvin eight of the 12 jurors had
expressed opinions regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused, but
in Sheppard's trial the 12 jurors all said they were free of preconcep-
tions.286 Neither were Marshall v. United States2 s' and Delaney v.
United States s  in point, for those holdings rested on the supervisory
powers over federal law enforcement and, in the case of Delaney, on
the fact that the government itself was responsible for the greater part
of the publicity.2s
The court of appeals also found that the publicity would not create
lasting opinions, and that no direct evidence that the jurors were biased
had been introduced. 290  The jury had been warned frequently about
exposure to trial press comment, and. it was presumed that the jurors
obeyed the instructions given them and were faithful to their oaths to
be impartial. To question jurors more often about the trial publicity
might well have impressed them with notions that did not previously
exist." ' Finally, it was felt that there was no reason for the trial judge
to believe that the publicity would have abated if a change of venue or
282. Id. at 63-64. The district court also found violations of due process in the
failure of the trial judge to disqualify himself, in the admission of testimony that Shep-
pard had refused to take a lie detector test, and in the unauthorized communications
the jurors made.while deliberating. Id. at 65-71.
28"3. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965).
284. Id. at 712.
285. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
286. 346 F.2d at 714-19.
287. 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
288. 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952).
289. 346 F.2d at 720.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 723.
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continuance had been granted.9 2 Judge Edwards dissented on the
grounds that the jury was exposed to trial publicity and that unauthor-
ized communications had been made.293
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1965,294 and on June 6,
1966 reversed the decision of the court of appeals.93 Speaking for the
Court in the eight to one decision, Justice Clark observed that the Court
had always eschewed direct restraints on the press in the courtroom,
for the press "guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the
police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny
and criticism." 296 Yet, the Court observed that there are occasions when
convictions should b'e reversed because of jury exposure to publicity,
as in Marshall, or because of the character of the pretrial publicity, as
in Irvin and Rideau.297 The Court recognized that in Rideau it had not
even been necessary for the accused to demonstrate the unfairness of
the trial, and that the conviction in Estes v. Texas was set aside with
no showing of prejudice.29
Justice Clark noted that "[i]t is clear that the totality of circum-
stances in this case also warrants such an approach." 9 Estes was granted
a change of venue, Sheppard was not; the Estes jury was sequestered,
the Sheppard jury was not.300 The judge's admonitions in Sheppard
were weak and inadequate, and "jurors were thrust into the role of
celebrities by the judge's failure to insulate them from reporters and
photographers." 8 01 The publicity in Sheppard was more widespread
than that in Estes, and included live television coverage of the inquest
at which Sheppard testified for more than five hours without the as-
sistance of counsel202
Sheppard may not have been denied a fair trial solely because of the
pretrial publicity, but the failure of the judge to protect him against the
292. Id. at 725. The court also held there was no denial of due process in the trialjudge's refusal to disqualify himself, in the introduction of evidence that Sheppard
refused to take a lie detector test, and in the unauthorized communications by jurors.
Id. at 725-36.
293. fd. at 754-55.
294. 382 U.S. 916 (1965).
295. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
296. Id. at 350.
297. Id. at 351-52.
298. Id. at 352.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 352-53.
301. Id. at 353.
302. Id. at 353-54.
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incidents of pretrial publicity combined with the conduct of the trial
itself were sufficient to work such a denial. The Court observed, "The
fact is that bedlam reigned at the courthouse during the trial and news-
men took over practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of the
participants in the trial, especially Sheppard." 30' Providing a table for
newsmen within the bar, Justice Clark continued, "is unprecedented."
Moreover, the judge did not have the ability to control the courtroom
environment once he had assigned most of the available seats in the
courtroom to newsmen. °4
Aside from the pretrial publicity and the courtroom bedlam, the news
coverage of the trial itself posed the possibility of prejudice. Much of
the press comment during the trial was never introduced in evidence,
and the press "often drew unwarranted inferences from testimony. At
one point, a front-page picture of Mrs. Sheppard's bloodstained pillow
was published after being 'doctored' to show more clearly an alleged
imprint of a surgical instrument." -05 The Court concluded that mem-
b-ers of the jury had been exposed at least to some of the adverse
publicity.30
The "fundamental error" of not protecting the accused from trial
and pretrial publicity was compounded by the trial court's "holding
that it lacked power to control the publicity about the trial." 307 There
were means "to reduce the appearance of prejudicial material and to
protect the jury from outside influence." The Court found that it was
not necessary to consider "what sanctions might be available against a
recalcitrant press nor the charges of bias now made against the state
trial judge." 308 Both the courthouse and courtroom were subject to
the control of the trial court, and steps should have been taken to pre-
vent the "carnival atmosphere" which surrounded the trial. The num-
ber of newsmen attending the trial could have been restricted; newsmen
should not have been allowed inside the bar, and should not have been
allowed to handle and photograph exhibits during trial recesses; press
contact could have been restricted with witnesses such as Susan Hayes
303. Id. at 355.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 357.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 358.
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who made frequent pretrial comments to the press regarding an alleged
love affair with Sheppard." 9
The trial judge could also have attempted to control the release of
information by police, counsel for both sides, and witnesses. Much of
the information released to the press was never introduced as evidence,
and much of it was inaccurate or misleading3l& The judge's failure to
exercise control over the release of information was not excused by
claims that much of the unwarranted publicity came from the defense
as well as the prosecution. The participation of the prosecution in the
release of information to the press "aggravate[d] the judge's failure to
take any action." -
Citing State v. Van Duyne,1 2 the Court suggested that "the trial court
might well have proscribed extrajudicial statements by any lawyer,
party, witness, or court official which divulged prejudicial matters." 313
The trial judge could also have asked that city and county officials issue
a regulation regarding the improper release of information by municipal
and county employees. Reporters could have been warned or cautioned
as to the dangers of press comment on matters not introduced as evi-
dence. Such procedures would have enhanced the possibility that Shep-
pard would receive a fair trial "without corresponding curtailment of
the news media." 314
Observing that cases involving prejudicial press coverage are "increas-
ingly prevalent," Justice Clark concluded that "trial courts must take
strong measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the
accused." 315 Further, the Court indicated that appellate courts should
independently evaluate the circumstances of a case on review. "Of
course, there is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events
that transpire in the courtroom," 316 Clark added. Nonetheless, the
Court noted, if pretrial publicity threatens the fairness of a trial, the
judge should take the initiative in suggesting to counsel that the jury be
sequestered, or order a new trial.
Yet "reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial meas-
309. Id. at 358-59.
310. Id. at 359-60.
311. Id. at 361.
312. 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964). Note 252 supra and accompanying text.
313. 384 U.S. at 361.
314. Id. at 362.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 362-63.
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ures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts must
take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes
from prejudicial outside interferences." 317 The trial court should not
allow any participant in a criminal trial or any law enforcement officer
within its jurisdiction to prevent the accused from having a fair trial
by coloring the atmosphere through the release of press statements.
The trial judge did not protect Sheppard "from the inherently preju-
dicial publicity which saturated the community," nor did he "control
disruptive influences in the courtroom." '18 Therefore, the habeas corpus
petition was properly granted and the court of appeals was in error in
reversing.319
LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE Sheppard
What do Rideau v. Louisiana, Irvin v. Dowd, Estes v. Texas, and
Sheppard v. Maxwell mean? Some observers detect a "decided trend,
on the part of the appellate courts, 'ever gaining in momentum and
respectability, to reverse criminal convictions on the ground that the
verdict may have been induced, at least in part, by newspaper reporting
prejudicial to the defendant." 320 Some see Sheppard as the "last patient
effort" of the Supreme Court to deal with cases involving prejudicial
publicity. 21 The real question, however, is what impact Rideau, Estes,
and Sheppard are having on subsequent cases involving prejudicial
publicity.
Venue and Continuance
The most notable case dealing with change of venue is Maine v.
Superior Court,-22 which held that appellate courts may review a trial
court's decision to deny a change of venue even though the accused has
not been tried. It is a customary judicial practice to delay ruling on
317. Id. at 363.
318. Id.
319. On retrial Sheppard was acquitted. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1966, at 1, col. 7.
320. Thompson, The Law Relating to Prejudicial News Reporting in Criminal Cases
in FREE PREss-FAIR TRIAL-A REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF A CONEFRENCE ON PREJUDICAL
NEWS REPORTING IN CRIMINAL CASES, ed. F. INBAU 8 (1964). The Thompson quotation
has been deliberately taken out of context. Vriting before Sheppard, Thompson seeks
to determine if there has been a trend toward greater judicial protection of the accused
in highly publicized cases.
321. Herndon, Sheppard v. Maxwell: The Sufficiency of Probability, 43 N.D.L. REv.
1,15 (1966).
322. 66 Cal. Rptr. 724, 438 P.2d 372 (1968).
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motions for change of venue until after the voir dire indicates whether
a fair jury can be obtained."tu
In Maine the petitioners asked the California Supreme Court to issue
a writ of mandamus directing the Superior Court of Mendocino County
to grant a change of venue on the ground that the case, involving charges
of murder, kidnapping, forcible rape, and assault with intent to commit
murder, had been so widely publicized that they could not get a fair
trial in Mendocino County. The court observed that it had never before
issued a writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to grant a change of
venue in a criminal case before the case had been tried, but that the
legislature had enacted legislation making the writ available to review
trial court orders granting or denying venue changes in civil cases.
The court reasoned, "A fortiori similar review should apply to assure
a fair trial in criminal cases where life and liberty are the premium." 3
24
The court did not believe the new practice would unduly delay trials,
for, should there be a great flood of petitions, many would b'e frivolous
and summarily denied. Moreover, by giving preliminary review to
motions for changes of venue, the court felt that it would be able to
provide safeguards against subsequent reversals on appeals.825 The court
found little support for the contention favoring the traditional practice
of conducting the voir dire before passing on motions for changes of
venue.
Delaying judgment on change of venue motions until the voir dire is
completed poses delicate problems for the defense counsel. Unless he
exhausts all of his challenges, he will have no ground for appeal. Yet
to exhaust all of his challenges may mean accepting a juror who is more
biased than the one excused. 26 When the juror is consciously or sub-
323. Note 61 supra and accompanying text.
324. 66 Cal. Rptr. 724, 726, 438 P.2d 372, 374 (1968).
325. Id. at 727, 438 P.2d at 375.
326. Id. The court observed that its holding on this point was consistent with the
REARDoN REPORT recommendation that a showing of actual prejudice need not be re-
quired in a motion for a change of venue or continuance. The Report also recommends
that a motion for a change of venue or continuance be disposed of prior to the im-
paneling of a jury. The Reardon standard for granting a change of venue or continuance
is based on the "reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such relief, a fair trial cannot
be had." The Report suggests that affidavits need not be required before a change
of venue or continuance is granted, and recommends that qualified public opinion
samples be used to help determine whether the defendant can get a fair trial. It also
recommends that if a motion for a change of venue is made after a jury has been
selected, the mere fact that the jury meets "prevailing standards of acceptability" should
not prevent the accused from receiving a change of venue or continuance. Finally, the
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consciously biased, the difficulty of detecting this prejudice is com-
pounded when the atmosphere is hostile to the accused. "We can only
conclude that the naked right to renew the motion for change of venue
is not an adequate remedy at law to require denial of a mandamus peti-
tion." 327 However, it would not be proper for the accused to seek
mandamus during or after the impaneling of the jury, for then the
defendant could stay the proceedings if the application were to appear
meritorious. 22 s
Although the holding in Maine runs contrary to the practice of most
American jurisdictions, the California court noted that courts in Minne-
sota do follow the Maine standard . 29 The California court also inter-
preted Sheppard as rejecting the traditional approach allowing the trial
court to grant or deny a change of venue within the sound exercise of
its discretion. Sheppard held that appellate courts have the duty to
make an independent 'evaluation of the circumstances of a case, "an
unmistakable implication that appellate courts must, when their aid is
properly invoked, satisfy themselves de novo on all the exhibits and
affidavits that every defendant obtains a fair and impartial trial." -30 In
addition, State v. Van Duyne3 suggested to the California court that
courts should be sympathetic to the notion that jurors cannot entirely
erase publicity from their unconscious minds. The Reardon Report, the
California court observed, is correct in suggesting that a change of venue
can often substantially reduce prejudice. These considerations led the
California court to regard the Reardon recommendations on change of
venue as "authoritative." 82
Report recommends that the accused should not necessarily be limited to one change of
venue, and that the claim that the venue should have been changed or continuance
granted should not be foregone by the defendant's waiver of a jury trial or by his
failure to use all of his peremptory challenges. See REARDON REPORT 119-28 (1966).
Cf. notes 61-111 supra and accompanying text.
327. 66 Cal. Rptr. at 728, 438 P.2d at 376.
328. Id.
329. Id., citing State v. Thompson, 266 Minn. 385, 123 N.W.2d 378 (1963), where
the Minnesota Supreme Court ordered the trial removed from Ramsey County to
Hennepin County on the defendant's request. The state argued that it would be im-
proper to remove the case to Hennepin County where the publicity was as great as in
Ramsey County. The court upheld Thompson's conviction against a claim that pub-
licity in Hennepin County denied him a fair trial. State v. Thompson, 393 Minn. 35,
139 N.W.2d 490 (1966).
330. 66 Cal. Rptr. at 728, 438 P.2d at 376.
331. 43 N.J. 368, 204 A.2d 841 (1964).
332. 66 Cal. Rptr. at 729, 438 P.2d at 377. For the REARDON REPORT recommendations,
see note 326 supra.
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Indeed, Sheppard, though not dealing with pretrial publicity alone,
has "rendered imperative the implementation of the standard governing
change of venue or continuance recommended in the Reardon Re-
port." 131 Should the Reardon Report standard be applied by trial courts,
there would not be much occasion for appellate courts to hear cases on
appeal or by writ of mandamus involving changes of venue. Such a
phenomenon also would be consistent with the admonition in Sheppard
that reversals are at best palliatives, and remedial measures are needed. '1 34
Maine was cited with approval by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals in its reversal of a manslaughter conviction 35 Although the
accused failed to exercise all of his peremptory challenges, the Oklahoma
court agreed with Maine that conventional voir dire practices place the
defense counsel in an awkward position.33 6 The ten affidavits submitted
by the accused that suggested he could not get a fair trial anywhere in
the county were part of the "totality of circumstances" surrounding
the defendant's motion for a change of venue. The prosecutor's proof
was "not sufficient to overcome defendant's proof of the possibility that
prejudice might have been generated from the newspaper articles." 33
The Oklahoma court held that when there is a reasonable possibility
that prejudice exists, a change of venue should be granted. Although
the record showed that each juror read something about the case, each
said he could be impartial. Nonetheless, the court said, "[W]here a
reasonable possibility of prejudice is shown to exist, concerning wide-
spread pre-trial publicity, and its possible effect on the jury panel is
shown to exist, then discretion seems . . . to dictate the change of
venue." 338 The court recognized that applications for changes of venue
are filed in many cases merely for the record, but in those cases the
accused does not produce ten affidavits supporting the claim that the
defendant cannot get a fair trial in the original jurisdiction. 39 In revers-
333. Id. at 730, 438 P.2d at 378.
334. Id. The court then reviewed the facts of the case and found the crime atrocious,
the victims prominent, the accused friendless, the locale not heavily populated, the com-
munity interest widespread, and press accounts prejudicial in that the confession of one
of the defendants was reported. In addition, the two opposing counsel were opponents
in a current electoral race for county judge. The court issued the writ of mandamus,
suggesting that the trial be removed to a large city like San Francisco. Id. at 731-33,
438 P.2d at 378-81.
335. Scott v. State, 448 P.2d 272 (Okla. Crim. 1969).
336. Id. at 274.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 274-75.
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ing and remanding to the trial court on the venue questions the court
noted that Sheppard requires appellate courts to make their own inde-
pendent evaluations of circumstances surrounding a trial and not to
"defer unduly to the discretion of the trial judge." 340
A federal court, in Pamplin v. Mason34' also took the position that a
change of venue may be an effective protection against community
prejudice. Mason was convicted in a Texas court of aggravated assault
upon a local peace officer, a misdemeanor for which Texas law denied
an accused the right to transfer his case. Nonetheless, Mason sought a
change of venue on the ground that there was great community preju-
dice against him as a result of his participation in the first civil rights
demonstration ever held in Falls County, Texas, the venue for his trial.
The trial judge denied the motion for a change of venue, and also re-
fused the defendant's request that jurors be examined individually on
the voir dire instead of being examined and qualified as a group.3 42
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed that although
Irvin v. Dowd requires that there be a clear nexus b'etween community
prejudice and the possibility of jury bias, Rideau, Estes, and Turner v.
Louisian3 43 hold that prejudice may be presumed and that "the proba-
bility of prejudice is inherent" in certain situations. 344 The court said,
"Where outside influences affecting the community's climate of opinion
as to a defendant are inherently suspect, the resulting probability of
unfairness requires suitable procedural safeguards, such as a change of
venue, to assure a fair and impartial trial." M Rideau, Estes, and Sbep-
pard have made it "unnecessary to prove that local prejudice actually
entered the jury box." 34' In Pamplin, where racial prejudice was strong,
the group voir dire was insufficient to detect actual prejudice.3 7
The Supreme Court elevated the change of venue in misdemeanor
340. Id. at 275.
341. 364 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966).
342. Although the offense charged was classified as a misdemeanor, the accused re-
ceived a jail sentence of two years and was fined $1,000. Id. at 3-4. Cf. Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
343. 379 U.S. 466 (1965). In Turner the Court reversed a conviction because the
two chief prosecution witnesses were deputy sheriffs in custody of, and thereby in close
association with, a sequestered jury.
344. 364 F.2d at 5.
345. Id. In the original habeas corpus proceeding the court held that a change of
venue is a constitutional guarantee, not just a privilege granted by the state. Mason v.
Pamplin, 232 F. Supp. 539 (W.D. Tex. 1964).
346. 364 F.2d at 6.
347. Id. at 7.
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cases to the level of a constitutional right in Groppi v. Wisconsin. 3 4
Father Groppi was convicted in a Wisconsin court on a charge of re-
sisting arrest, and was denied a change of venue by the trial judge on
the ground that a Wisconsin statute prohibited a change of venue in
misdemeanor cases 4 The Court held that, the Wisconsin statute not-
withstanding, the fourteenth amendment requires that "a defendant must
be given an opportunity to show that a change of venue is required in
his case." 350
Voir Dire
Silverthorne v. United States351 is a significant voir dire case which
placed reliance on Sheppard. San Francisco area newspapers published
more than 300 articles concerning Silverthorne, who was convicted of
misapplying bank funds and making false entries in bank records.3 52
348. 91 S. Ct. 490, 491 (1971).
349. Id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court also construed the state statute as limiting the
change of venue to felony cases.
350. Id. at 494. Justice Black dissented on the ground that remedies other than the
change of venue can be exercised to give the defendant a fair trial by an impartial jury.
Other cases suggest judicial concern over the change of venue and continuance as
tools to neutralize publicity. In United States v. Daniels, 282 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Ill.
1968), the court granted the accused a continuance, but refused to allow the defendant
to waive a jury trial without the government's consent. In People v. Pratt, 27 App.
Div. 2d 199, 278 N.Y.S.2d 89, 91-93 (1967), a New York court granted a change of
venue where the defendant's confession had received widespread press attention as the
result of a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of the confession. It was held that
the trial court could have excluded the press from the pretrial hearing and that, in any
event, the publicity given to the confession had created a reasonable probability of
prejudice to the defendant. Cf. United States v. Birrell, 269 F. Supp. 716 (S.D. N.Y.
1967), where the court denied the defendant's motion for a pretrial hearing on the
exclusion of evidence. The court held that such a hearing would be likely to prejudice
the defendant's right to a fair trial under Sheppard. In any event, a change of venue
or continuance would be likely should the pretrial hearing be held. Thus, it was held
that a postponement of the hearing would minimize the possibility that the defendant
would be denied a fair trial because of press publicity. 269 F. Supp. at 728. Contra, see
United States v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 274 F. Supp. 790 (W.D.
Pa. 1967), Note 212 supra and accompanying text. Relying on Rideau v. Louisiana, the
Louisiana Supreme Court approved the violation of two articles of the state constitution
by holding that a state trial judge had not erred in granting two changes of venue and
in moving the case beyond a district adjacent to the original district. The court
reasoned that a mere "legislative pronouncement" should not endanger the "basic re-
quirement of constitutional due process." State v. Mejia, 250 La. 518, 197 So. 2d 73, 76
(1967). Cf. notes 81, 83, and 86 supra and accompanying text.
351. 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968).
352. Id. at 630-31. Coverage by the electronic media was also great. State charges
were brought against the defendant, but were dismissed by the trial judge because of the
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The court of appeals believed that widespread publicity was inevitable
m a case involving the failure of a major bank, an investigation by the
Senate Committee on Governmental Operations, and the defendant's
own "flamboyant and bizarre conduct including his marital and gam-
bling activities with losses of almost one-half million dollars . .. ." 353
The important question did not involve the fact that there was wide-
spread publicity adverse to the accused, but dealt with the trial court's
success in neutralizing the publicity and guarding the defendant against
prejudicea5 4
The court rejected the argument that the indictments themselves were
invalid because of the surrounding publicity,3 55 and held that it was not
error for the trial court to deny the defendant's motion for a continu-
ance prior to the completion of the voir dire.50 It was reversible error,
however, for the trial judge not to conduct the voir dire in a manner
that would allow him to discover biased jurors.
Each of the 65 veniremen had some knowledge of the case before
being called for service. In the face of such widespread pretrial exposure
to publicity, the trial judge adopted the "Arizona Plan" on the voir dire,
asking all the questions himself and, for the most part, directing his
questions to the panel at large and not to individual jurors. 5' As a result
of this procedure, four jurors never responded to the judge's questions
concerning their opinions of the case, with two of the four never being
questioned about the publicity issue at all. 58 Sheppard's requirement
that the balance should never be weighed against the accused was, there-
fore, violated. If the voir dire is to mean anything, it must mean that
prejudice has not been allowed to infiltrate the jury box. The voir dire
for Silverthorne was not adequate since the judge's questions were lead-
ing and designed to evoke responses from the veniremen that they were
not prejudiced. Further, the entire voir dire was too general to be effec-
amount of publicity surrounding the case. Id. at 631. Cf. notes 112-19 supra and ac-
companying text.
353. 400 F.2d at 631.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 632-34. The court noted that the Senate Committee conducted its inves-
tigation before the indictments were returned, that there was a substantial time lag
between the indictments and the Senate investigation, and that the grand jury is, after
all, an accusatory body guided by the standard of "reasonable probability" and not
by the standard of "guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
356. Id. at 634.
357. Id. at 635-36.
358. Id. at 637.
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tive. Since the trial judge did not determine what the jurors had or
had not read or heard, he was in no position to pass on their impartiality.
Merely going through the form of a voir dire was not sufficient.35 9
Although Irvin v. Dowd held that jurors need not be altogether un-
knowing about a case, the question of "whether a juror can render a
verdict based solely on evidence adduced in the courtroom should not
be adjudged on that juror's own assessment of self-righteousness 'with-
out something more." 60
Trial Press Coverage and Trial Conduct
Although the pretrial publicity raised a strong probability of preju-
dice, the publicity which occurred during the course of the Silverthorne
trial bore "less of the indicia of probability; it approached prejudice
per se." 3,1 On numerous occasions the trial judge refused defense mo-
tions for a mistrial and for interrogation of the jurors to determine the
-effect of trial publicity on them. The trial court took the position that
interrogation of the jurors would call newspaper stories to their atten-
tion. On one occasion jurors were observed reading newspapers in
the jury room, and one juror had collected all news articles relating to
the trial. Even when this irregularity was called to the judge's atten-
tion, he denied the defense counsel's request to prohibit jurors from
reading newspapers on the ground that he could not deprive them of
the pleasure of reading a morning newspaper.
The court of appeals held that the trial court had an affirmative duty
to protect the defendant from possible prejudice resulting from trial
publicity. In such a situation, the ordinary assumption that jurors are
faithful to their oaths and follow the judge's instructions not to expose
themselves to trial publicity was of little, if any, weight. 2 Although
preventing jury exposure to trial publicity is difficult when the jury is
not sequestered, Sheppard, the court said, requires the trial judge "to
assume until he has established otherwise by voir dire examination, 'that
359. Id. at 638.
360. Id. at 639. The court observed that the failure of the judge to inquire of the
jury what information they had and its source was especially prejudicial in view of the
fact that almost 30 percent of the veniremen expressed fixed opinions of the guilt of the
accused. Moreover, only five jurors were ever questioned individually, and the trial
court denied the defendant's request that the voir dire be more specific and individual.
It was prejudicial error for the court not to interrogate those jurors who had not com-
mitted themselves. Id. at 640.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 640-41.
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some of this material reached the members of the jury.' "0 The trial
judge should have interrogated each member of the jury in camera when
requested to do so by the defense counsel. The failure of the trial judge
to discharge his duties created a "probability of prejudice." 364
Since 1966, other appellate courts have reversed convictions because of
exposure to potentially prejudicial influences during the trial. The Ne-
vada Supreme Court relied on Sheppard to reverse a conviction where the
trial court erred in not interrogating jurors to determine whether they
had been exposed to newspaper articles appearing during the trial.3 6 5 The
court observed that while most due process claims require a showing
of actual prejudice, Estes and Sheppard require that the judge control
the courtroom. Moreover, Estes and Rideau hold that there are times
when a showing of probable prejudice can be substituted for the actual
bias standard.36 Illinois courts have also relied on the "total circum-
stances" rule of Sheppard to reverse convictions where the trial judge
failed to determine if jurors had been exposed to trial publicity. 367
In trial conduct cases, the Supreme Court has reversed other convic-
tions since Sheppard on similar grounds. In Parker v. Gladden,36 the
Court overturned an Oregon murder conviction where the bailiff as-
signed to watch the locked jury told one juror that the accused was
wicked and guilty and told another juror that the Supreme Court would
reverse a conviction if there should be an -error in finding the defendant
guilty. The Supreme Court also reversed a Texas conviction on the
ground that the trial judge violated Rideau in permitting television and
still cam'era photography in the courtroom. 69 Other appellate courts
have reversed convictions when the jury was exposed to trial publicity,
363. Id. at 643-44.
364. Id. at 644.
365. Crowe v. State, 84 Nev. 358, 441 P.2d 90 (1968).
366. 441 P.2d at 93.
367. People v. Cain, 36 Ill. 2d 589, 224 N.E.2d 786 (1967); People v. Cox, 74 Ill. App.
2d 342, 220 N.E.2d 7 (1966). Cf. People v. Hryciuk, 5 Ill. 2d 176, 125 N.E.2d 61 (1954).
368. 385 U.S. 363 (1966). In the per cirriam opinion the Court relied on Sheppard,
but Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that the case, unlike Estes, was not "'inher-
ently lacking in due process.'" Thus the actual prejudice standard of Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717 (1961) and Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952), should apply. 385
U.S. at 368.
369. Carroll v. Texas, 392 U.S. 664 (1968), rev'g Carroll v. State, 397 S.W.2d 82 (Tex.
Crim. 1966). Chief Justice Warren and Justices Harlan, Stewart and White voted to deny
certiorari.
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but have relied on the "older" rule of Marshall v. United States rather
than on the "new" cases of Rideau, Estes, and Sbeppard.370
Release of Information and Exclusion of Newsmen
As a consequence of the greater attention given to publicity in the
new cases attempts have been made by some judges to issue court rules
restricting the release of information. Such was the case in the trial
of Richard Speck.371 The judge in the Charles Manson trial also adopted
a court rule prohibiting lawyers, police, grand jurors, and prospective
witnesses from making extrajudicial statements about the merits of the
case.37 2 However, attempts to prohibit pretrial publication of informa-
tion by court order have not always been successful. 373
Similarly, attempts to close pretrial hearings or portions of trials to
the press have met with mixed success. Azbill v. Fisher374 upheld the
exclusion of the press from a Nevada preliminary hearing, but Phoenix
Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court3 75 and other cases point in the oppo-
site direction. In Oxnard Publishing Co. v. Superior Court 76 the court
issued a writ of mandamus to the Superior Court of Ventura County
to open a trial to the press when the record indicated that more than
half the trial had been held in camera. The court reprimanded the
370. See Mares v. United States, 383 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1967); Watson v. State, 413
P.2d 22 (Alaska 1966); State v. Rinkes, 70 Wash. 2d 854, 425 P.2d 658 (1967), all resting
on Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959). If appellate courts seem to have
reversed more cases involving trial publicity than pretrial publicity since 1966, the
reason may be that the standards for finding prejudice in cases involving trial publicity
were more stringent than were the standards in cases involving pretrial publicity before
Rideau, Estes and Sheppard. Cf. notes 120-60 supra and accompanying text.
371. See People v. Speck, 41 I1. 2d 177, 242 N.E.2d 208 (1968). The court held
that the massive publicity surrounding the Speck case did not deny the accused a fair
trial. The Chicago Superintendent of Police prior to Speck's arrest made a public
statement identifying Speck as the slayer, saying that he had been identified by the
one survivor in the slaying of several Chicago nurses and that his fingerprints had been
found at the scene of the slayings. Prior to the trial the court issued an order prohibit-
ing the release and publication of various categories of information, including the names
and addresses of prospective witnesses. 242 N.E.2d at 212, 214-15. See notes 403, 404
infra and accompanying text.
372. N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1969, at 31, col. 1.
373. See County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. App. 2d 670, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 435 (1967); note 257 supra and accompanying text. Cf. State ex rel. Sentinel
Star Co. v. Lambeth, 192 So. 2d 518 (Fla. App. 1966). The New Jersey Supreme Court
has also attempted to enforce the Canons of Ethics of the ABA to prohibit improper
pretrial comment by counsel. See State v. Kavanaugh, 52 N.J. 7, 243 A.2d 225 (1968).
374. 84 Nev. 414, 442 P.2d 916 (1968), note 210 supra and accompanying text.
375. 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P2d 594 (1966), note 207 supra and accompanying text.
376. 261 Cal. App. 2d 505, 68 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1968).
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trial court for relying on the Reardon Report and Sheppard as authority
to restrict press attendance at the trial, for the report recommends re-
stricted press attendance only in cases where there is a real possibility
that press coverage might endanger the defendant's right to a fair trial,
and Sheppard contains no suggestion that trials or portions of trials be
closed to the public and press.3 7
The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that a Kentucky statute ex-
cluding the general public from all cases involving children does not
apply to the trial of an adult for contributing to the delinquency of a
a minor. Indeed, the press "should be accorded some priority ... for they
have facilities to disseminate the information of what transpires to a
much broader audience than those who can gather in a crowded court-
room." 178 A California court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the
Superior Court of Main County to vacate an order prohibiting the
inspection of the transcripts of witnesses' testimony at grand jury pro-
ceedings. Although Sheppard gives the judge authority to protect the
accused from publicity, the court felt the trial judge exceeded his au-
thority by permanently removing the records from public inspection. 9
AN ASSESSMENT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
How does one assess the impact of the line of cases culminating in
Sheppard? Obviously, they (and the work of groups like the American
Bar Association) have had some effect: Convictions have been reversed
because of the probability that prejudice might result from press com-
ment or coverage. Protections such as change of venue have been given
greater attention, and court rules to protect the accused from prejudicial
publicity have been adopted in some jurisdictions. But a more compre-
hensive examination requires a qualified assessment of the Rideau, Estes,
and Sheppard line, for in the vast majority of cases the criminal justice
system goes on as before, with or without press comment, and the re-
versal of a conviction on prejudicial press publicity grounds is the
exception. Of 202 cases involving publicity issues decided over a period
of about three years beginning in 1966, only 12 resulted in the setting
aside or reversal of convictions.3 80
377. 68 Cal. Rptr. at 94-95. The Court also cited A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME
AND PuBLICITY (1967) to support its argument that closing trials to the public and press
may well do more harm than good. Id. at 96-97.
378. Johnson v. Simpson, 433 S.W.2d 644, 648 (Ky. 1968).
379. Craemer v. Superior Court, 265 Cal. App. 2d 216, 71 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968).
380. Although the 202 cases have been thoroughly indexed, they have not been cited
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To be sure, there is the possibility that the survey of recent cases did
not include all appellate cases involving publicity, and some reversals
may have been overlooked; however, the searching procedure was a
systematic one, supplemented by checking citations in law review ar-
ticles. Any error would probably result from overlooking cases which
affirmed convictions, for judges are more likely to cite authorities in
reversing lower courts than in upholding them.3 ' Another indicator
suggesting that the 202 cases constitute a reliable estimate is that an inde-
pendent count of cases by the Legal Advisory Committee on Fair Trial
and Free Press of the American Bar Association revealed only 421
federal and state appeals between 1951 and 1969."82
The 12 reversals seem even less significant than their statistical pro-
portion might indicate when they are examined individually, since six
of the reversals involved jury exposure, or possible jury exposure, to
press comment during a trial. There seems to be a greater tendency
for courts to reverse convictions in cases involving trial publicity than
in cases involving pretrial publicity, because the traditional legal view
has been that once the trial is underway the trial judge cannot employ
the change of venue, continuance, voir dire, or other pretrial remedies
designed to detect juror bias and neutralize adverse publicity.3s'
Of the six reversals dealing with pretrial publicity, Rubenstein v.
State,8 4 involving the trial of Jack Ruby, seem to be sui generis. Al-
though the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals relied on Estes, Sheppard,
for purposes of brevity. The author will supply the citations upon request. Groppi
v. Wisconsin, 91 S. Ct. 490 (1971), was decided after the survey was made. See notes
348, 349, and 350 supra and accompanying text.
381. For the suggestion that legal periodicals may be cited more often when precedent
is reversed than when it is upheld, see Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United States
Supreme Court, 3 MIDWEST JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SciNcE 58 (1959).
382. A.BA. LEGAL ADVISORY CommisTrxsr o- FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PREss, THE RIGHTS
OF FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PREss 7 (1969).
383. The six reversals involving trial publicity include Mares v. United States, 383
F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1967); Watson v. State, 413 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1966); People v. Cain,
36 Ill. 2d 589, 224 N.E.2d 786 (1967); People v. Cox, 74 Ill. App. 2d 342, 220 NE.2d 7
(1966); Crowe v. State, 84 Nev. 358, 441 P.2d 90 (1968); State v. Rinkes, 70 Wash. 2d
854, 425 P.2d 658 (1967). See notes 365, 367, and 370 supra and accompanying text.
Rinkes is not a conventional case, prejudicial news items having been sent to the jury
room by mistake along with prosecution exhibits. See also United States v. Chase, 372
F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1967), where the court of appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision
to declare a mistrial for all defendants in a joined jury-non-jury trial where newspaper
articles of the past record of the jury defendants were found in the jury room. The
trial judge reasoned that to continue with the trial of the non-jury defendants would
prejudice the jury defendants should the former be found guilty. 372 F.2d at 464-65.
384. 407 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Crim. 1966).
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and Rideau in holding that the trial court erred in not transferring
Ruby's case to a venue other than Dallas, 8 5 it seems reasonable to sug-
gest that the Texas court may have perceived the case as one where the
entire system of criminal justice in Texas was on trial. If many cases
involving prejudicial publicity are causes celebres, then the Ruby case is
a cause celebre of a special kind.
One reversal, State v. Spidle, 86 did not involve the usual prejudicial
publicity claim. In Spidle a juror acquired his first information about
a criminal case from the press, said he believed from the press account
that the accused was guilty, and admitted that he would choose the
testimony of the prosecution witness, a state trooper, over that of the
accused in case of doubt.
Of the remaining four reversals, Silverthorne v. United States has
already been discussed.317 In State v. Shawan,388 the New Mexico Su-
preme Court reversed a conviction on the ground that the trial judge
erred in denying a change of venue to the defendant without hearing
the question of whether jurors read a newspaper article detailing the
criminal record of the accused. The court thought this to be especially
important since the defendant had used all his peremptory challenges.
An Ohio Court of Common Pleas, in 1967, vacated a ten-year-old con-
viction on the ground that no actual prejudice need be shown in a case
in which pretrial publicity catalogued the defendant's past criminal
record and previewed the prosecution's case before it was presented in
court.3s9 Finally, the Supreme Court, in a memorandum opinion in
1968, relied on Rideau in reversing a Texas conviction where television
and still cameras were used in the courtroom.3 90
The record of appellate and trial courts since 1966 is not solely one
of reversals; these courts have been aware of the new standards of prob-
able and inherent prejudice in Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard. Appellate
courts have granted evidentiary hearings to criminal defendants so that
lower courts could determine whether the defendants were injured by
385. Id. at 795, 798.
386. 413 S.W.2d 509 (Mo. 1967).
387. Notes 351-64 supra and accompanying text.
388. 77 N.M. 354, 423 P.2d 39, 41-42 (1967).
389. Forsythe v. State, 12 Ohio Misc. 99, 230 N.E.2d 681 (1967).
390. Carroll v. Texas, 392 U.S. 664 (1968), rev'g Carroll v. State, 397 S.V.2d 82
(Tex. Crim. 1966). Note 369 supra and accompanying text. See also Groppi v.
Wisconsin, 91 S. Ct. 490 (1971), decided after the analysis of the 202 cases since
Sheppard was made. Notes 348, 349, and 350 supra and accompanying text.
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publicity.391 Of course, an appellate court's remand of a case for an
evidentiary hearing on the impact of pretrial or trial publicity does not
mean that the defendant's conviction will be reversed. The Supreme
Court of Dutchess County, New York, for example, conducting such
a hearing on command of the New York Court of Appeals, has inter-
preted the Sheppard rule as meaning that publicity must be "so ines-
capably and inexorably prejudicial to an accused as to militate against
his being accorded a fair trial." 392 Bias cannot be presumed on the basis
of mere publicity, since Sheppard deals not only with pretrial publicity
but with the conduct of the trial itself. To presume prejudice a court
must consider the total circumstances surrounding a case, not merely
the publicity. 9 3
Counting reversals is neither the only nor necessarily the best way to
measure the impact of Supreme Court decisions, but such a procedure
is useful in illuminating some of the special problems of the law in the
trial by newspaper area. The new publicity cases may have had some
impact on prosecutors, police, defense counsel, and trial judges,9 4 but
they have resulted in relatively few reversals. One reason the reversal
rate has not been greater may be that an increasing number of appeals
are frivolous. The 202 cases analyzed above are quite a large number
when compared with the 421 cases cited by the American Bar Associ-
ation for the period from 1951 to 1969. Thus, one result of Rideau,
Estes, and Sheppard may be encouragement of criminal defense counsel
to make appeals and claim errors involving prejudicial publicity. A
political scientist has noted a similar trend in appeals involving search and
seizure issues,395 and it is probable that without Rideau, Estes, and
Sbeppard, the impetus for a large number of apparently frivolous preju-
dicial publicity claims would not exist.396
391. See, e.g., Walker v. People, 160 Colo. 286, 417 P.2d 14 (1966); Baldwin v. Com-
monwealth, 406 S.V.2d 860 (Ky. 1966).
392. People ex rel. Rohrlich v. Follette, 55 Misc. 2d 201, 284 N.Y.S.2d 770, 773
(1967). The case was heard on remand from the New York Court of Appeals, 282
N.Y.S.2d 729, 20 N.Y.2d 297, 229 N.E.2d 419 (1967).
393. 284 N.Y.S.2d at 773-74.
394. J. Stanga, The Press and the Criminal Defendant: Newsmen and Criminal Justice
in Three Wisconsin Cities, 1971 (unpublished dissertation, University of Wisconsin).
395. See S. NAGEr, TiH LEGAL PRocEss Faovt A BEHAVIORAL PRPSPECTIV 299-302 (1969).
396. See, e.g., Marxuach v. United-States, 398 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1968) (there is no
error if no juror can recall having heard or seen any publicity and the only publicity
took placetwo months before the trial); Loraine v. United States, 396 F.2d 335 (9th
Cir. 1968) (there is no ground for reversal if there is no showing that publicity is at
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Another reason that so many appeals have been unsuccessful is
that courts easily distinguish the nonrepresentative and extreme cases
from other cases characterized by widespread publicity adverse to the
accused. In 1967, the Supreme Court of Maine affirmed the conviction
of an accused convicted of the murder of a state trooper, even though
two jurors had contributed to a fund for the slain trooper's family and
12 had knowledge of the fund and the case. The court interpreted
Sheppard and Estes to apply to both pretrial and trial publicity, and
found those authorities not applicable when the issue was limited to pre-
trial publicity 9T In a case involving possible jury exposure to trial
publicity, a California appellate court held that it was not reversible
error for the trial judge to fail to poll the jury about articles appearing
during the trial. 9s
The "totality of circumstances" rule espoused in Sheppard as a guide
to evaluate cases involving prejudicial publicity also raises questions. Ob-
viously, the "totality of circumstances" includes both pretrial and trial
press comment and coverage, but does this mean that there would have
been no reversal in Sheppard had there been no pretrial publicity? Or
does it mean that there would have been no reversal had the conduct
of the trial and the nature of the trial press coverage been different,
though the pretrial publicity may have been as great? Although Rideau
makes it clear that pretrial press coverage alone can be inherently preju-
dicial and Estes suggests that inherent prejudice can be based on the
conduct of the trial itself, the fact remains that many courts have re-
garded Sheppard as an unusual case with application in only limited
situations.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found no denial of
due process in the failure of a state trial judge to grant a change of
venue where the pretrial publicity was extensive and 38 out of 120
veniremen had formed opinions based on the publicity. The court held
that Irvin, Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard were all extreme situations, and
added that in Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard, the trial judge or the state
promoted publicity or permitted laxity in the courtroom. 3 9 The Court
least potentially prejudicial to the accused); State v. Corliss, 430 P.2d 632 (Mont. 1967)
(the mere fact that a news account of a crime has been published does not mean that
the accused has been prejudiced).
397. State v. Beckus, 229 A.2d 316, 318-20 (Me. 1967). The Maine Supreme Court
observed that the widespread publicity about the fund and the slain trooper's family
did not constitute prejudicial publicity.
398. People v. Canard, 257 Cal. App. 2d 444, 65 Cal. Rptr. 15, 28 (1968).
399. Myers v. Frye, 401 F.2d 18, 20 (7th Cir. 1968).
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of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that widespread publicity adverse
to the accused did not result in a due process violation when the pub-
licity did not even remotely resemble that in Sheppard. The Eighth
Circuit held that the actual prejudice rule may be discarded, but only
when there is massive publicity of a saturation level which makes preju-
dice highly probable.4Q0
When the publicity given a case has approached the same magnitude
as that in Sheppard, there has been no easy test to determine whether
the accused has been prejudiced. A Maine television station presented,
with the active cooperation of law enforcement agencies, a documentary
concerning a crime carrying the clear implication that the defendant was
guilty. The Maine Supreme Court held that, while the documentary was
deplorable, Irvin, Sheppard, and Rideau were not applicable to the case:
The voir dire did not reveal a pattern of prejudice, the documentary
was shown but once, the accused did not confess, and the trial judge
allowed the defendants to challenge for cause any juror who had seen
the film or any objectionable parts of it.40 Likewise, the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court dismissed the Sheppard rule as not being appropriate, in
a widely publicized case involving the murders of two girls and the
attempted murder of another, holding that Irvin does not require that
jurors be totally ignorant.40 2
The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Richard Speck
with the wry reminder that Speck "had to be tried in some commuriity
in the State of Illinois." 40' In the frial, which had beefi transferred
from Chicago to Peoria, the defendant was given 160 peremptory chal-
lenges (the defense used -less than half), and 250- to300 jurors were
excused or refused because of a preconceived belief in Speck's guilt.
The court held that Irvin does not require that jurors be totally ignorant
of a case and there was, therefore, no prejudicial error in Speck's trial.
The court distinguished the cases on the ground that Irvin, unlike Speck,
exhausted all his peremptory challenges. Moreover, as in Beck v. Wash-
ington, the publicity in Speck dissipated after the first coverage given
the mass murders themselves and the search for a suspect.4 4
400. McWilliams v. United States, 394 F.2d 41, 44 (8th Cir. 1968).
401. State v. Coty, 229 A.2d 205, 208-13 (Me. 1967).
402. State v. Herrington, 41 Wis. 2d 757, 165 N.W.2d 120, 123-24 (1969).
403. People v. Speck, 41 111. 2d 177, 242 iN.E.2d 208, 212 (1968).
404. 242 N.E2d at 212-14.
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CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis does not purport to indicate that Sheppard
and the other new cases have been incorrectly applied. Rather, it points
out the difficulty in attempting to apply the rules to concrete fact situ-
ations with any certainty that such applications are deserving. It is,
of course, impossible to achieve exactitude with most verbal formulas,
but Sheppard poses more problems than most. The fact situations under-
lying the new line of publicity cases make it difficult to apply the legal
norms 'embodied in these decisions to cases involving some, but not too
much, publicity. There is no mathematical formula to determine when
the burden of proof should be on the accused to show actual bias or
when the facts reveal inherent prejudices. From this study it is not
possible to develop a quantitative measure of the effects of Rideau,
Sheppard, and Estes, but it is clear that the publicity cases have not had
the kind of influence that cases involving racial discrimination have
had. 405
Similarly, the new publicity cases have not had the influence that
Miranda v. Arizona has had, even though the Miranda decision is one
thing on paper and another in practice. 4 6 The difference is not because
there are no borderline situations in cases involving racial discrimina-
tion or police interrogations, but because those cases deal with more
general phenomena and thereby make it easier to proscribe certain
categories of behavior.
The limited success that courts have had in applying Rideau, Estes,
and Sheppard, however, should be considered in the light of the fair
trial and free press problem at the trial level. In the end, the wisdom
of Sheppard lies in the admonition to trial judges to do what they can
in an imperfect world to protect the accused from adverse press cov-
erage. The problem of trial by newspaper will not disappear, but Sbep-
pard will have been a success in averting the problem if it alerts judges
to steps they can take to mitigate the potential harmful effects of press
coverage adverse to the accused. In holding out the possibility of relief
to the accused whose case has received widespread and adverse press
comment, the message of Sheppard is directed to trial courts, where
relief can bc best secured.
405. See, e.g., Vines, Federal District Judges and Race Relations Cases in the South,
26 J. POL. 337 (1964).
406. Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's
Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MicH. L. Rav. 1347 (1968).
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ADDENDUM
Shortly before this article was published, the murder trial of Bobby
Seale in New Haven, Connecticut, ended with a hung jury. The judge
then dismissed all indictments against Seale on the ground that the ex-
tensive and adverse publicity would make it extremely difficult to secure
an impartial jury for a second trial. As the Seale murder trial ended,
another cause c61bre was beginning in Yuba City, California, where
Juan V. Corona was arrested in connection with the mass murders of
migrant farm workers. The Seale and Corona cases illustrate the suc-
cesses and failures in protecting the criminal defendant against adverse
press coverage.
The Seale case involved the torture and murder of Black Panther
Alex Rackley. The brutal crime itself was enough to raise serious ques-
tions as to the possibility of widespread press comment which would
prejudice any defendant charged. The fact that all 14 persons impli-
cated in connection with the crime were Black Panthers raised the addi-
tional question of the public image of the Black Panther- Party itself.
The press and government, party defenders said, had created an oppro-
brium of the party that would make it difficult, perhaps impossible, for
any Panther to receive a fair trial. °  For instance, during the jury
selection phase of one Panther trial, the F.B.I. released its annual report
which described the Black Panther Party as the country's "most danger-
ous and violence-prone of all extremist groups." 4 08
Another facet of the case involved Seale himself, known to the public
as the defendant in the Chicago Conspiracy trial whose distruptive be-
havior had led to a contempt citation.409 In addition, securing of a fair
trial for Seale and co-defendant Mrs. Ericka Huggins was made even
more difficult because the trial was preceded by that of Lonnie McLucas,
407. Yale University President Kingman Brewster, Jr., was quoted as saying that he
was skeptical of the ability of black revolutionaries to achieve a fair trial anywhere in
the United States. See N.Y. Times, April 25, 1970, at 1, col. 1. For press coverage gen-
erally unfavorable to the Black Panther Party, see Time, May 11, 1970, at 25, 29,
and Epstein, The Panthers and the Police: A Pattern of Genocide?, The New Yorker,
Feb. 13, 1971, at 45.
408. N.Y. Times, July 14, 1970, at 21, col. 1.
409. Seale's lawyer was ill and could not defend him during the Chicago trial, and
Seale protested the trial judge's refusal to allow him to defend himself. For an account
of the Chicago trial, see Danelski, The Chicago Conspiracy Trial in PoLTCAL TLUs
49 (T. Becker ed. 1971). Seale did not disrupt the New Haven trial, and seemed to
respect the trial judge. See N.Y. Times, May 23, 1971, Sect. IV, at 8, col. 1 and April
22, 1970, at 52, col. 1.
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one of the original 14 Panthers arrested. 410  The prosecution's main
argument in the Seale trial was that Seale ordered the murder of Rack-
ley because the Panthers believed Rackley to be a police informer; much
of the evidence to be presented at the Seale trial on this and other points
was first presented at the McLucas trial.411
Aware of the possibility of prejudice to the defendants because of
press coverage, the court took steps to insure a fair trial. The judge
issued an "Order for Courthouse Procedure" which prohibited the use
of photographic, television or sound equipment in the courthouse or on
the grounds immediately adjacent and the making of sketches in the
courtroom. In addition, the order enjoined all participating lawyers
and their employees from making statements for publicity purposes, or
from making statements likely to result in the public disclosure of preju-
dicial information. The order also prohibited the county medical exam-
iner, court officials, prospective witnesses and jurors from making extra-
judicial statements about the case, and enjoined demonstrations in the
courthouse or within 500 feet of it, save on the New Haven Green.1
Great care was also exercised in the selection of jurors for the case.
The time taken to select the jury (from November 17, 1970 to March
11, 1971) is believed to be the longest for any trial. Some 1,550 venire-
men were called, of whom 1,035 were examined on the voir dire. Most
of the veniremen examined were excused because they admitted that
they had preconceived opinions about the case or about the Black Pan-
ther Party which would prevent them from being impartial.
413
The jury began its deliberations on May 19th, but was unable to
reach a verdict by May 24th. On May 25th the judge granted a defense
motion to dismiss all charges against the defendants. He said, "I find
410. Seale and Mrs. Huggins were charged with kidnapping resulting in death, con-
spiracy to murder, and conspiracy 'to kidnap. Scale was also charged with first degree
murder, and Mrs. Huggins was charged with aiding and abetting murder with intent to
commit a crime. N.Y. Times, September 30, 1970, at 35, col. 3. McLucas was convicted
of conspiracy to murder but acquitted of intent to commit a crime. After the jury
reached its verdict in the McLucas trial, McLucas' attorney said, "I believe they gave
a black revolutionary a fair trial." See N.Y. Times, September 1, 1970, at 1, col. 3.
411. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, August 7, 1970, at 1, col. 1 and August 15, 1970, at 51, col. 1.
412. See McLucas v. Palmer, 427 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1970), where four of the Panther
defendants unsuccessfully sought to have the "Order for Courthouse Procedure" set
aside. On at least one occasion during the trial the order was violated by a potential
witness. See N.Y. Times, August 15, 1970, at 51, col. 1.
413. For press accounts of the jury selection process, see N.Y. Times, March 12,
1971, at 43, col. 2 and Feb. 21, 1971, Sect. IV, at 12, col. 1.
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it impossible to believe that an unbiased jury could be selected without
superhuman effort-efforts which this court, the state and these de-
fendants should not be called upon 'either to make or to endure." 414
Judge Mulvey observed that it would be almost impossible to select a
new jury before the end of 197 1. 5
Sheppard and its progeny seem to have influenced the trial court in
its adoption of procedures designed to protect Seale and Mrs. Huggins
from adverse press coverage. It may well be that the use of protective
procedures by the court did shield the defendants from harm flowing
from prejudicial publicity.410 In a broader sense, however, the law
failed to provide tools which would allow the successful completion
of tle judicial process. The Seale case is a study of the judicial system
under stress, a stress which the system was unable to withstand. When
Judge Mulvey dismissed the charges against the defendants, he in es-
sence admitted its inability to meet the challenge.
The decision to dismiss the charges against Seale and Mrs. Huggins
may have been based on the recognition that a trial court's utilization
of procedures to protect a defendant from publicity is often inversely
related to its ability to secure the defendant a speedy trial.4117 Seale and
Mrs. Huggins remained imprisoned from the time of their arrests to the
dismissal of the charges against them. Clearly, the great care exercised
in the selection of the jury contributed to the defendants' failure to
receive a speedy trial. Whatever protection against adverse press cov-
erage may have been afforded was obtained at the expense of the lengthy
incarceration of defendants who were found to be neither guilty nor
innocent.
The Corona case illustrates the failure of judicial rules in preventing
the pretrial publication of information adverse to an accused. Corona,
a migrant labor recruiter, was arrested in Yuba City, California, on May
414. N.Y. Times, May 26, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
415. Id. For the suggestion that Judge Mulvey should have made the "superhuman
effort" required to select a new jury, see N.Y. Times, May 30, 1971, Sect. IV, at 6, col. 5.
416. There were sympathetic demonstrations on behalf of the Panthers and allegations
that the Black Panther arrests were part of a government conspiracy to eliminate the
party. On May 1, 1970, for instance, some 15,000 demonstrators in New Haven pro-
tested the arrests and pending trials of Panthers. But it is possible, perhaps likely, that
the demonstrators generated more antipathy than good will toward the Panthers. For
an account of the May 1 demonstration, see N.Y. Times, May 2, 1970, at 1, col. 4.
417. The trial judge made references to the lengthy incarceration of the defendants
in dismissing the charges against them. See N.Y. Times, May 26, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
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26, 1971, and charged with the murders of 10 men. 418 The bodies of
the 10 men and other bodies were found buried in shallow graves about
five miles outside Yuba City.419 The victims were believed to be mi-
grant farm workers, and each was hacked in the face, the back of the
head, and the chest with either a machete or heavy knife.
When Corona was brought before a judicial officer on the day of his
arrest for his initial appearance, the court issued an order prohibiting
the sheriff's office, the district attorney's office, and other public officials
involved in the case from making statements about evidentiary matters
not a matter of public record. The order also prohibited the taking of
photographs of Corona.4 20  The order, however, came after Sutter
County Sheriff Roy Whiteaker had informed the press that he believed
Corona guilty of the crimes: "We're certain he [Corona] committed
the murders," the sheriff said, adding that the murders seemed to be the
work of one man.42'
After the court issued its order, the press continued to obtain and
publish information adverse to the accused. The order has not prevented
the publication of such information partly because some officials covered
by the order seem to have violated it.422 In addition, the press obtained
information about Corona and the case from unofficial news sources,
and relied upon information available in public records in their coverage
of the case. Press reports that police seized a machete and two pairs of
bloodstained men's undershorts from Corona's pickup truck were ob-
tained from public records.424
The press also relied upon public records to report that about 15
months before Corona's arrest one Jose Raya had been found in a
cantina in nearby Marysville "viciously beaten with wounds about the
418. See L.A. Times, May 27, 1971, at 1, col. 2. It was expected that Corona would
later be charged with more murders.
419. At this writing, 25 bodies have been found.
420. See L.A. Times, May 27, 1971, at 1, col. 2 and May 29, at 20, col. 2.
421. L.A. Times, May 27, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
422. Sheriff Whiteaker told the press the following: "In my opinion, the nature of
the wounds and their savagery, the disposition of the bodies of the murder victims
and the sheer number of victims, indicates that the perpetrator of these offenses is at
least seriously mentally ill and probably a homicidal maniac." See L.A. Times, May 30,
1971, at 20, col. 1. The public defender representing Corona early in the case also
confirmed the existence of a ledger maintained by Corona. The ledger contained 34
names, some of which were believed to be the names of murder victims. See L.A. Times,
June 5, 1971, at 1, col. 2, and June 17, 1971, at 32, col. 1.
423. See L.A. Times, May 29, 1971, at 21, col. 1. See also L.A. Times, May 30, 1971, at
22, col. 1; June 1, 1971, at 3, col. 2; and June 5, 1971, at 1, col. 2.
424. See L.A. Times, May 29, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
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back of the head similar to those of the men whose bodies have been
unearthed." 42 Raya survived after 18 hours of brain and plastic sur-
gery. The press reported that Corona had been at the cantina at the
time, but had not been charged for lack of evidence. A jury, however,
had returned a $250,000 judgment against Navidad Corona, Juan's
brother and owner of the cantina.426
Widespread press comment adverse to the defendants characterizes
both the Seale and Corona cases, but there are qualitative differences in
the press coverage. Much of the potentially injurious publicity in the
Scale case was directed at the Black Panther Party generally rather than
at the individual defendants. In addition, the focus of the publicity was
not on evidentiary matters. The unfavorable publicity about the Black
Panther Party unquestionably made the Seale-Huggins trial a difficult
one for any judge to supervise, but who can deny that the Black Panther
Party is not a legitimate subject of public discussion?
In contrast to the news coverage in the Seale case, press coverage in
the Corona case has emphasized evidentiary matters and Corona's char-
acter and background. It could be argued that the press ought to pub-
lish some evidentiary information in a case involving crimes of the
magnitude with which Corona was charged in order to quiet public
apprehensions, but the press has shown far too much zeal in meeting
any such obligation. Moreover, press reports that Corona was once
committed to a mental institution and that some persons believe Corona
to be somewhat peculiar seem hardly necessary to provide the citizenry
with the information it needs to make intelligent decisions about crime.427
The above analysis suggests that in both the Scale case and the early
stages of the Corona case the law has not adequately dealt with a de-
fendant's right to a fair trial in the face of adverse press coverage. This
is not to say, however, that recent judicial approaches to the fair trial-
free press problem have been generally ineffectual, or that judicial rem-
edies which place direct restraints on the press should be utilized. In-
deed, the careful supervision of the Seale trial by the court seems to
have made a difficult case manageable, at least for one trial. Although
the judicial system can be found wanting for failing to resolve the Scale
case, the courts are not the only political institutions which sometimes
malfunction under the stresses and strains of American society.
425. LA. Times, May 30, 1971, at 22, col. 1.
426. Id.
427 . See L.A. Times, May 28, i971, at 26, col. I and May 29, 1971, at 21, col. 1.
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Should the Corona case go to trial, careful judicial supervision may
well counterbalance any adverse pretrial publicity. Direct restraints on
the press, however, as in the exercise of the constructive contempt
power, are inimical to the American tradition of a free press. Such
restraints, in any case, would not likely be countenanced by many
American judges.42' The law can alleviate, but not solve, the problem
of trial by newspaper. Rather than ask that government restrict the
press, a democratic citizenry should demand that the press provide bal-
anced and responsible coverage of criminal cases.
428. See notes 222-50 supra and accompanying text.
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